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Résumé : 
 La disparitions graduelle des peurs liées à l’inflation pendant l’ère de la «Grande 
Modération» macroéconomique est aujourd’hui chose révolue : la crise financière 
américaine des «Subprimes», la «Grande Récession» ainsi que la crise des dettes 
souveraines qui s’en est suivie ont abouti à un nouvel ordre économique caractérisé 
par une volatilité accrue de l’inflation, un accroissement des chocs dans les prix des 
matières premières et une défiance envers la qualité de la signature de certains 
émetteurs souverains pour n’en mentionner que trois caractéristiques. De la 
réduction des émissions de titres souverains indexés sur l’inflation aux taux réels 
négatifs jusqu’à de très longues maturités, cette nouvelle donne tend à mettre en péril 
aussi bien les stratégies conventionnelles de couvertures inflation que les stratégies 
directionnelles purement nominales . Cette thèse a pour but d’investiguer les effets de 
ces évènements qui ont changé la donne macro-financière et d’évaluer leurs 
conséquences en terme de couverture inflation aussi bien dans la gestion actif-passif 
des investisseurs institutionnels que sur l’épargne des particuliers. Trois stratégies 
alternatives de couverture sont proposés pour y faire face. 
Descripteurs : Couverture Inflation, Allocation de Portefeuille, Investissements Alternatifs, 
Matières Premières, Taux Réels, Inflation Sous-Jacente, Global Macro, « Passage de 
l’inflation », Allocation Stratégique, Assurance de Portefeuilles, Grande Récession. 
Abstract:  
Gone are the days when inflation fears had receded under years of “Great 
Moderation” in macroeconomics. The US subprime financial crisis, the ensuing 
“Great Recession” and the sovereign debt scares that spread throughout much of the 
industrialized world brought about a new order characterized by higher inflation 
volatility, severe commodity price shocks and uncertainty over sovereign bond 
creditworthiness to name just a few. All of which tend to put in jeopardy both 
conventional inflation protected strategies and nominal unhedged ones: from reduced 
issues of linkers to negative long-term real rates, they call into question the viability 
of current strategies. This paper investigates those game changing events and their 
asset liability management consequences for retail and institutional investors. Three 
alternative ways to achieve real value protection are proposed. 
Keywords : Inflation Hedging, Portfolio Allocation, Alternative Investment, Commodities, 
Real Rates, Core Inflation, Global Macro, Inflation Pass-through, Strategic Allocation, 
Portfolio Insurance, Great Recession. 
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Principales abréviations 
ADF: Augmented Dickey–Fuller test. 
ALM: Asset Liability Management. 
AR: Auto Regressive. 
BEI: Breakeven Inflation rate. 
BS: Black-Scholes 
CHS: Core versus Headline Swap. 
CI: Core Inflation. 
CMS: Constant Maturity Swap. 
CPI: Consumer Price Index. 
CPPI: Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance. 
CW: Constant Weight. 
DIHTS: Dynamic Inflation Hedging Trading Strategy. 
EMH: Efficient Market Hypothesis. 
FFF: Fixed-For-Float. 
FR: Fail Rate. 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. 
HI: Headline Inflation. 
HmC: Headline minus Core inflation. 
ILB: Inflation Linked Bond. 
IR: Information Ratio. 
IRF: Impulse Response Function. 
LT: Long Term. 
MV: Minimum Variance. 
NAV: Net Asset Value. 
OAT: Obligation Assimilables au Trésor. 
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OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
OTM: Out of The Money. 
P&L: Profit and Loss. 
PFE: Perfect Forecast Environment. 
PLGF: Profit or Loss Given Default. 
REIT: Real Estate Investment Trusts. 
RPI: Retail Price Index. 
S&P-GSCI: Standard & Poor-Goldman Sacks' Commodity Index. 
ST: Short Term. 
SVAR: Structural Vector Auto Regressive. 
T-Bill: Treasury Bill. 
TIPS: Treasury Inflation Protected Securities. 
ToR: Turnover Ration 
VAR: Vector Auto Regressive. 
VECM: Vector Error Correction Model. 
WI: Weight Index. 
ZC: Zero Coupon. 
ZCIIS: Zero Coupon Inflation Index Swaps. 
ZCNB: Zero Coupon Nominal Bond. 
ZCS: Zero Coupon Swap. 
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A foreword on the Genesis of the Project 
As of January 2009, all French retail banks were authorized to distribute the 
“Livret A”, a more than two century old savings account initially designed to rebuild 
French people’s savings after Napoleon’s lengthy and costly continental wars. Until 
then, the distribution of this state-sponsored savings account had been restricted to a 
trio of banks comprised of the Banque Postale and the Caisses d’Epargnes for the 
“Livret A” and the Crédit Mutuel for the “Livret Bleu”. The breakup of the exclusive 
distribution rights had been ordered a little over two years prior by the European 
Commission (European Comission, 2006) in application of Articles 43 and 49 of the 
Rome Treaty, of which France had been found to be in breach: “The Commission 
fears that these special rights may infringe the Treaty by raising obstacles to the 
freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services (Articles 43 and 49) and 
“The Commission’s objective is to create the conditions for fair competition on the 
liberalized market in savings products in France, and particularly to remove any 
barriers to the entry of new operators into the market.” Banks which had been left out 
claimed victory even if it turned out to be a Pyrrhic one. 
This momentous regulatory change could not have occurred at a worse time for 
them: markets were reeling from the ongoing meltdown of the financial system 
caused by the US subprime crisis and individual investors had witnessed their equity 
portfolios’ value being almost complete wiped out. Meanwhile, sovereign rates 
bottomed out as investors fled to safety. Risk aversion was rife and rising and 
inflation surged in proportions which had not been seen in decades. In this context, 
the offering of a then AAA-state guaranteed, liquid and inflation protected investment 
attracted crowds. Indeed, in the months following the liberalization, tens of billions 
of deposits a month were removed from balance-sheet savings accounts and flowed 
into the almost off-balance sheet “Livrets A”. As the crisis continued and soon 
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engulfed the Eurozone’s peripheral sovereign issuers, its success became lasting and 
banks were left grappling with a pincer movement made of both diminishing deposits 
and massive inflation liabilities. Had inflation kept rising at the time, it could well 
have been a modern day Trafalgar for French retail banks having claimed victory a bit 
too early. 
As time goes on, an increasing share of those deposits on “Livrets A” are flowing 
to the Caisse des Depots et Consignations, further straining banks’ balance sheets. 
But the real concern has been on the part that is left to private banks but which still 
has to be remunerated at least as much as the current level of headline inflation, 
thereby generating a more than a hundred billion euro inflation liability problem. Its 
sheer size meant that it could not possibly be hedged by investing in sovereign 
inflation-linked bonds, issuances of which were too small and already in high 
demand, forcing asset-liability management desks to turn to inflation derivatives in 
order to hedge this risk. To make matters even worse, the contemporaneous demise of 
Lehman Brothers and the ensuing severe restructuring of the financial sector dealt a 
double blow to large inflation hedgers as the number of trading houses quoting 
French inflation derivatives fell and new rules regarding counterparty risk severely 
curtailed the maximum credit exposure any of the remaining houses could have, thus 
restricting even further the potential supply of hedging securities. The quest to find 
alternative inflation-hedging strategies had become a vital concern. As Crédit 
Agricole SA’s asset-liability management division had the single largest inflation 
exposure, it was only natural for them to begin exploring alternative solutions and 
Mr. Patrick Fincker, then head of interest rate risk, thus proposed to finance a PhD on 
this issue, the achievements of which are detailed hereunder. As he left for CA-CIB 
in June 2012, the project was transferred to Mr. Philippe Ithurbide, Global Head of 
Research and Strategy of Amundi AM, who supervised the project through to its 
completion while its scope was broadened to address the needs of investors seeking 
more diverse inflation-hedging solutions. 
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Introduction: Going Forward under Immoderate 
Macroeconomics 
1. THE DRIVERS OF INFLATION HEDGING 
Inflation hedgers worldwide can be divided between those that are compelled by 
law or contract to do so and those who choose to do so as an investment strategy: in 
the first category we will find institutional investors such as British pension funds, 
which have to offer pensioners a guaranteed real value for their retirements, and, in 
the second category, we will find their American peers which choose to offer real 
return targets to their investors. As economic realities cannot be written in black and 
white, we will find a swarm of investors in the middle ground which are somewhat 
driven by imperative and partly driven by strategy: this last category includes French 
retail banks hedging their inflation-linked retail savings products or insurers which 
offer policies that, by law, are guaranteeing real values. As both of these are exposed 
to short-run inflation liabilities, they have the option not to fully hedge this inflation 
and therefore keep the risk on their books. This combination of imperative and 
strategic decisions has generated a massive influx of money into inflation hedging 
assets which could be defined as “too many dollars chasing too few [securities]”. 
This steady increase in the demand for inflation hedging assets as inflation remains 
muted overall begs for an answer. 
As Volcker’s monetary tightening drive in the late seventies took its toll on the 
rampant inflationary pressures in the US economy, the “Great Inflation” era seemed 
to have come to a close (Meltzer, 2005). But as investors were ushered into a new era 
of receding inflation and overall macroeconomic stabilization, the days of cheap oil 
were numbered: emerging economies were showing signs of economic take-off. As 
those countries transformed their economies and caught-up with more advanced ones, 
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so did their oil consumption. Depressed oil prices in the decades following the oil 
shocks (Mabro, 1987) as a result of both economic difficulties (Hamilton, 2011) and 
large offshore discoveries in the eighties led to a dramatic underinvestment in oil 
production whose consequences would only be felt at the end of the noughties: an 
ever rising demand became no match for the growth in production. As the financial 
cataclysm hit the world’s most advanced economies, crude oil prices returned to a 
high and volatile state, driving inflation upward in most countries and threatening to 
annihilate any timid sign of economic recovery. Throughout this period, the very 
nature of inflation drivers had changed as headline inflation indices faced a roller-
coaster ride of a very different nature from the one experienced in the seventies 
(Blanchard & Gali, 2007): core inflation was now flat for every advanced economy 
(van den Noord et André 2007) and (Clark et Terry 2010).  
 
Figure 1: Crude oil and inflation over forty years in the US 
 
 
The subprime crisis and the ensuing “Great Recession” (Farmer, 2011) have had a 
lasting impact in the form of depressed economic activity and non-existent wage 
increases contemporaneously with inflation creeping upward (Levanon, Chen, & 
Cheng, 2012). While the effects of the non-conventional monetary policies 
implemented in the wake of the financial crises have not yet shown any clear signs in 
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terms of inflationary activity, negative long-term real rates became a pressing reality 
for asset liability managers: the dangers posed by ever growing unhedged inflation 
liabilities seem all the more acute as constantly increasing flows of investors spooked 
by the surge in inflation and the financial market crash sought inflation protection. 
There are few reasons for this demand to abate as the populations in advanced 
economies age while seemingly being unable to reform their increasingly fragile 
redistributive pension systems, the consequences of which will most probably be an 
increase in the demand for private pension schemes, which have embedded 
purchasing power guarantees, synonymous of inflation protection (Zhang, Korn, & 
Ewald, 2007). As the prospect of stable and moderate inflation fades, with it vanishes 
the underpinning of inflation-linked bond issues by sovereign states. As the 
macroeconomic paradigm shifts and the future of the primary inflation-linked market 
is challenged, the time to rethink inflation hedging has come. 
 
Figure 2: Real sovereign 10 year yields for France, the UK and the US 
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2. THE CONVENTIONAL PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION TO HEDGE 
INFLATION 
Gold has remained largely synonymous with inflation protection for centuries if 
not millennia. Wars, empires, industrial revolutions, gold standard, stock market and 
real estate bubbles and crashes came and went but the magic of gold remained largely 
intact. Unsurprisingly therefore, time passed without burnishing the real value of the 
yellow metal which to this day maintains its position as the grail of real value 
(Dempster & Artigas, 2010). But gold itself is not immune to boom and bust 
phenomena. Even though gold’s very long-term inflation hedging properties are 
undeniable, its propensity to attract feverish investor confidence, especially in time of 
economic turmoil, makes it a highly unsuitable asset to hedge inflation when it comes 
to accounting or as a guarantee of purchasing power. While gold remained the asset 
of choice for state coffers then central banks with infinite horizon, the same logic 
cannot apply to individual investors as J.M. Keynes famously remarked: “In the long 
run we are all dead”. Through one’s lifetime, the value of gold will have gone up or 
down and will take years if not decades before a correction occurs, which is most 
likely substantially longer than our desired investment horizon. 
 
Figure 3: Real and nominal gold prices over fifty years. 
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Hardly a week goes by without an article on a new inflation hedging asset class or 
a new allocation technique. But in truth, there is no more a magic inflation hedging 
allocation than there is a silver bullet: inflation is solely linked to explicitly inflation-
linked securities such as linked bonds or swaps. All other asset classes have only 
time-varying hedging capabilities and therefore offer limited protection (Attié & 
Roache, 2009). Linked bonds have accordingly become the core of inflation hedging 
literature and make up the bulk of inflation hedged portfolios today (Bodie Z. , 1988). 
Yet, this one and only solution remains unsatisfactory for many investors: linked 
bonds are available in limited supply and accordingly suffer from low returns and less 
than optimal liquidity and depth compared to their nominal equivalents (D’Amico, 
Kim, & Wei, 2008). This is partly due to the fact that more than thirty years after 
their introduction in the United Kingdom, the issuance of private linked bonds has 
remained largely marginal and therefore confined to a few sovereign or quasi-
sovereign issuers (Garcia & Van Rixtel, 2007). The problem has become all the more 
acute as the current sovereign crisis has raised credible questions on the opportunity 
for sovereign issuers to stick to their real issue policy in the face of rising costs as 
inflation crept up and long-term real rates, which have turned negative, have become 
the norm for many large nominal sovereign issuers. 
As good times bring on bad habits, the “Great Moderation” era (Stock & Watson, 
2003) of the decades preceding the subprime crises was no exception. This period 
witnessed an exceptional context of low and stable inflation which progressively 
relaxed the inflationary fears of the seventies and smothered memories of the high 
and volatile inflation which had characterized it. Rising inflation volatility at the turn 
of the last decade brought back those fears believed to be long lost and resulted in a 
new wave of interest in inflation protection. But the most pernicious effect of this 
new context was yet to come as nominal rates went down contemporaneously with 
inflation shooting up: purely nominal un-hedged strategies started to backfire 
dangerously and required a profound rethink of their use. Moreover, as central banks 
all over the OECD countries started to implement unconventional monetary tools and 
expand their balance sheets, there were fears that the problem could only get worse as 
quantitative easing and Twists become household names (Baumeister & Benati, 
  
- 22 - 
2010). This new investment climate motivated researchers to move into a new era of 
alternative hedging strategies that would neither be linker based nor dependent on a 
macroeconomic moderation hypothesis that had shown its limits. 
 
Figure 4: The share of linkers in sovereign issues for France, the UK and the US 
 
 
3. MOVING AWAY FROM LINKERS WITH PORTFOLIO INFLATION 
INSURANCE 
One of the most enduring testimonies of the financial meltdown brought about by 
the subprime mortgage crisis in the US can be found in the elevated level of risk 
aversion worldwide (Caceres, Guzzo, & Segoviano Basurto, 2010). The ensuing 
European sovereign crisis only fueled an additional flight to quality syndrome which 
had gripped investors fleeing the hazardous combination of an equity bear market of 
historic proportions and the first significant spikes in headline inflation for at least 
two decades. The combination of both of these factors resulted in increased demand 
for at least inflation protected investments, if not theoretically nominal and real risk-
free products, namely investment grade linkers. But the rise in the demand for them 
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was not to be matched by an equivalent rise in their issuance as sovereign treasuries 
were themselves battling with rising financing costs precisely as a result of this 
inflation linkage. The very raison d’être of linkers had backfired badly as they turned 
out to be more expensive to issue than their nominal counterparts in times of rising 
inflation. This inevitably leads to the return of the question that had plagued inflation 
protection research in its nascent phase: the availability problem of linkers. 
Considering the overwhelming debt overhang problem which looms over most 
sovereign issuers from industrialized countries, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
inflation will eventually be the last available weapon left in the state’s arsenal to fight 
bulging balance-sheets. Resorbing debt through monetary erosion will probably lead 
to a revision of sovereign issue policies which could in turn lead to some reduction in 
the share of linkers in new issues if not an outright reduction in their output. By the 
look of issues in the last couple of years, this policy shifting is in fact probably 
already underway. Yet, the foreseeable scarcity of new inflation-linked bonds could 
be bypassed if we were capable of replicating linkers with purely nominal assets 
which would also have inflation hedging capacities (Brennan & Xia, 2002). There is a 
large body of literature on natural inflation hedging assets (Amenc, Martellini et 
Ziemann 2009) such as commodities or listed real estate (REITs) which delves into 
their potential resilience to both expected and unexpected inflation shocks and their 
ex-ante optimal allocation in inflation hedging portfolios. But none of these 
alternative asset classes has a guaranteed value at maturity or even a real (and 
nominal) floor like linkers do. Moreover, as most of the demand for inflation hedging 
assets comes from asset-liability-management desks, it adds another layer of 
complexity as they require not only a real floor but also a certain level of real return 
to match part of their funding costs. Clearly, not all of these requirements can be met 
simultaneously, but a mitigation approach can be found in the application of portfolio 
insurance (Leland, 1980) to our problem. 
This asset management classic from the seventies is transposed into real asset 
protection in the form of the Dynamic Inflation Hedging Trading Strategy (DIHTS) 
derived from Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance (CPPI). This new framework 
developed in (Fulli-Lemaire, A Dynamic Inflation Hedging Trading Strategy, 2012) 
envisages the inclusion of strong real return yielding assets with high volatility ones 
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like Equities, Commodities and REITs to hedge a fundamentally low inflation 
volatility risk. It enables the real upside of these alternative assets to be captured, 
while significantly limiting the downside risk. The intrinsic limit of this strategy 
would be the persistence of negative long-term real rates which impede the inception 
of the strategy. This is unfortunately the case in the current investment environment, 
in which the combination of low nominal rates as a result of non-conventional 
monetary policies, coupled with temporarily higher than officially targeted inflation, 
are yielding negative real rates until very long maturities. This approach has been 
extended by (Graf, Haertel, Kling, & Ruß, 2012) in their optimal product design 
under inflation risk for financial planning. 
 
4. A GLOBAL MACRO APPROACH TO ALLOCATE COMMODITIES 
The decade long commodity bull-run which came to a close in the summer of 
2008 had seen crude oil prices breach the psychological barrier of one hundred 
dollars a barrel for the first time in current value since the two oil shocks of the 
seventies (Baffes & Haniotis, 2010). The ensuing “Great Recession” brought an 
abrupt end to a decade which witnessed the rise of emerging countries, whose 
growing commodity consumption had spurred their prices to reached unprecedented 
peace-time levels. Commodities had become known as the inflation hedging crisis-
robust alternative investment class of choice. By 2012, more than 400 billion dollars 
of commodities had found their way into investors’ portfolios, a more than tenfold 
increase in a decade according to a Barclays commodity survey (Barclays Capital, 
2012). Their appeal only momentarily waned as losses on commodity investments 
mounted during the recession-induced global fall in demand and lost their luster as 
the investment class which had withstood the first part of the financial crisis 
unscathed. Contrarian’s triumph was short lived as a combination of government 
intervention to support growth in emerging countries, persistent geopolitical tensions 
throughout the Middle East and resurging concerns on the timing of peak oil rapidly 
hit back at the bear run and promptly sent the Brent benchmark crude index hovering 
back above $100 a barrel.  As recession gripped Europe and slowing growth 
worldwide took their toll on industrial metals, demand for agricultural commodities 
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climbed as droughts, floods, and conflicts damaged crops and stocks. As in all 
turbulent times, demand for precious metals soared. 
 
Figure 5: Commodities before and after the Great Recession 
 
The underlying motive behind commodities’ pivotal role in inflation protected 
portfolio allocations, apart from their obvious high risk-high reward profile, begs for 
an answer which is to be found in the nature of the relationship between investable 
asset classes and inflation. When it comes to inflation linkage, they can be separated 
into inflation-driving and inflation-driven ones. On the one hand, as commodity price 
changes feed directly into inflation and, conversely, cash rate hikes counteract it 
when they are used as monetary policy tools, they both naturally qualify as inflation 
drivers. On the other hand, since bond investment dwindles under rising inflation or, 
inversely, real estate investments should go up as rents adjust to inflation, it firmly 
anchors them in the inflation-driven side of our categorization of investment classes. 
It is worth noting that equities also mostly behave as inflation-driven assets even if its 
impact seems particularly investment-horizon dependent: as they are stores of relative 
value, which entitles their holders to the share of a real assets’ cash flows, they 
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should be inflation neutral at the long end as nominal cash flows gradually adjust to 
inflation over time, but should be negatively impacted in the short run until the 
inflation adjustment takes place. 
From a portfolio protection point of view, investing in inflation-driving assets 
seems the prudent choice as they should perform better at hedging inflation risk in 
both the short and the long end, therefore providing investors with an inflation-
protected liquidity option on their investment at any time. Commodities thus arose as 
the potentially lucrative real-return yielding alternative asset class even if their price 
variations are significantly more volatile than those of the liability benchmark they 
are intended to outperform (Bodie Z. , 1983). In this context, are current allocation 
techniques performing satisfactorily or should we endeavor to find a radically new 
approach that would take into account the inflation driving factor? (Fulli-Lemaire, 
Allocating Commodities in Inflation Hedging Portfolios: A Core Driven Global 
Macro Strategy, 2012) goes down this path in applying advances in macroeconomics 
to achieve an efficient allocation. 
 
Figure 6: The evolving correlation between commodities and inflation in the US  
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As commodity prices rose, economic agents’ perception of their impact on 
inflation seems to have amplified. Indeed, their increasing influence on the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI), a proxy measure for headline inflation, has been extensively 
documented by econometricians and macroeconomists in the last two decades 
(Blanchard & Gali, 2007). It appears that around the mid-nineties a macroeconomic 
paradigm shifting began to unfold in the following way: while the pass-through of 
exogenous commodity price shocks into headline inflation increased by a half, the 
equivalent pass-through into core inflation seems to have ceased. While these results 
should have profound implications for liability-driven commodity investors, there is 
still a clear gap in the literature on this subject as no one seems to have exposed the 
financial implications in terms of allocation technique those economists have paved 
the way for. This is especially true of the link between investable commodities and 
inflation liabilities: we therefore proceed toward our macro-driven allocation by first 
evidencing a link between the headline to core inflation spread and tradable 
commodities. We subsequently intend to exploit this link in three ways: Firstly by 
devising an efficient strategic allocation using core inflation forecasts to determine 
the commodities’ natural weight in the portfolio as dictated by our macro approach. 
Secondly by testing a tactical allocation strategy which would time the inflation pass-
through cycle to dynamically determine the optimal share of commodities in the 
allocation. And finally by proposing a strategy to arbitrage core inflation-linked 
derivatives by cross-replicating them with commodity portfolios. In light of those 
results, one could still wonder whether headline indexation is suitable for all 
investors since its mean reverts to core inflation in the medium term. Should some 
investors opt for a reference swap for their liabilities? 
 
5. SWAPPING HEADLINE FOR CORE INFLATION  
Longer-term investors exposed to inflation during the financial crisis probably felt 
stuck between anvil and hammer as in the short run, surging commodity prices 
pushed their inflation-linked liabilities higher while their assets dwindled in mark-to-
market as a result of falling equity and other alternative fair values. Meanwhile, 
persistently low nominal rates and even negative real rates threatened the stability of 
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their balance sheet in the longer run. To a certain degree, this asset-liability gap could 
be closed with the alternative inflation hedging techniques previously exposed. Yet, 
deviating from the most plain vanilla assets to embark on the world of either 
structured solutions as proposed in (Fulli-Lemaire, A Dynamic Inflation Hedging 
Trading Strategy, 2012) or through a refined use of alternative asset classes as in 
(Fulli-Lemaire, Allocating Commodities in Inflation Hedging Portfolios: A Core 
Driven Global Macro Strategy, 2012) is certainly not risk-free even though it offers a 
certain degree of risk mitigation. Be it in the portfolio insurance scheme or the pass-
through partial hedging technique, both of these solutions incorporate an increased 
reliance on risky asset classes such as commodities which can at times experience 
brutal swings in value. The rollercoaster ride that commodity investors have gone 
through in the last decade is particularly enlightening on the dangers of such 
endeavors. Considering the macroeconomic paradigm shift exposed in the second 
chapter, and in particular the muted response of core inflation to exogenous 
commodity price shocks and the mean reversal of headline to core inflation yielding a 
lower relative volatility for the latter, it raises the question of whether we should invest 
in headline inflation-linked investments at all. That is obviously only the case if we 
can bear to hold our investment for a sufficiently long period of time for the pass-
through cycle to operate fully.  
In other words, not all inflation hedgers should be treated equals as long-term 
players with investment horizons that extend beyond that of the expected duration of 
the mean-reverting process should choose to target core inflation despite their 
headline inflation liabilities. The pass-through cycle rarely exceeds five years and 
seems to have even been shortened in the last decade compared to the average 
duration of pension funds’ investment horizons which can extend to several decades. 
This liability duration criteria therefore draws a wedge between long-term and short-
term inflation hedgers as the former should seek core inflation protection while the 
latter should strive to obtain a headline inflation hedge. The obvious pitfall of this 
methodology is that to this date, no core inflation-linked asset exists. Deutsche Bank 
(Li & Zeng, 2012) recently announced the launch of an investable proxy for core 
inflation which paves the way for an outright core-linked market which would be the 
equivalent of the headline-linked market that materialized at the turn of the last 
century in the US, a little over a decade after its British counterpart appeared. 
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Figure 7: The volatility spread between headline and core inflation in the US. 
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inflation hedges is currently severely curtailed by extremely low real rates at the 
maturity they could invest in. In essence, it yields an intermediated commodity 
investment for short-term players which would boost their return on a risk-adjusted 
basis. The second additional benefit of this new derivative would be the onset of a 
market curve for core inflation that could be derived from the trading of these swaps 
and enable easy mark-to-market valuation of other core-linked securities in balance 
sheets, therefore also easing the way for future issuances of truly core-linked assets in 
the primary market. The last hurdle these products would face is the potential 
disequilibria between the potential demand from long-term and short-term players, 
the former probably massively outweighing the latter. Any supply and demand market 
disequilibrium between long-term sellers of headline inflation and short-term sellers 
of core inflation could be matched by the intermediation of market makers which 
could price the derivative based on the cross hedging potential of commodities since 
we have also showed in (Fulli-Lemaire, Allocating Commodities in Inflation Hedging 
Portfolios: A Core Driven Global Macro Strategy, 2012) that the inflation spread is 
highly co-integrated with commodity indices.   
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Chapter 1, A Dynamic Inflation Hedging Trading Strategy 
using a CPPI 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 The demand for inflation hedges from pension funds has spurred the academic 
literature on optimal portfolio allocation and investment strategies for durations up to 
several decades. These types of long haul strategies are designed to match future 
liabilities that must be provisioned but that do not require specifically that the mark 
to market value of their investments matches that of their liabilities in the short run. 
In this paper, we set ourselves in the different context of commercial banks that need 
to hedge their inflation liabilities arousing from retail products such as guaranteed 
power purchasing saving accounts, term deposits, or even asset management 
structured products. All of these guarantees are immediately effective and their 
duration rarely exceeds a decade. Moreover, a constant access to liquidity is required 
for these open funds which can face partial or total redemption any time during their 
lifetime. 
 This new framework requires the construction of an investment strategy that 
must have a positive mark to market real value at its inception and throughout its life. 
Also, because of the constraints resting on the inflation linked market we expose in 
our first part, we seek to develop a strategy that would be purely nominal, that is 
entirely free of inflation indexed products which are costly and therefore reduce the 
potential real return. After summarizing the possible alternative inflation hedges in a 
second part, we explore the feasibility of adapting portfolio insurance techniques to 
the inflation hedging context in order to honor our guarantees while exploiting the 
inflation hedging potential of alternative asset classes. We seek to avoid the use of 
derivative instruments which costs can be prohibitive considering the scale of the 
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policies, issuance strategies and current deficits which result in a fluctuating primary 
supply. Moreover, most of the buyers in the primary market acquire those assets on a 
hold to maturity basis or for immediate repo, rendering the secondary market 
relatively more illiquid than the one of their nominal counterparts, as is evidenced in 
the working paper (D’Amico, Kim, & Wei, 2008). 
 The derivative market for inflation is characterized by relatively high 
transaction costs as a result of shallow depth at reasonable price. Since on the one 
hand the sellers of those instruments will either have to hedge their trading books on 
the shallow and illiquid primary inflation market or assume the full inflation 
directional risk as a result of cross-hedging on nominal assets but on the other hand 
face a huge demand, the required premiums are very high. There has been since the 
mid 2000 a liquid market for exchange traded inflation swaps which has enabled to 
price inflation breakeven rates. There is to this day no liquid exchange traded market 
for inflation options as most of the deals are done in an Over-The-Counter basis. If 
the domestic supply of inflation linked instruments is not sufficient to meet the 
demand, as it is often the case, there is little international diversification can do as 
inflation is mostly a domestic variable which correlation to other foreign equivalents 
can be fickle, even in the case of monetary unions or currency pegs where foreign 
exchange is not an issue like in the Euro-Area. The recent Euro-area sovereign crisis 
has made this point all the more acute. 
 This gap between supply and demand in the inflation financial market has 
spurred the interest in alternative inflation hedging techniques that could solve the 
depth, cost and liquidity issues that have plagued the inflation financial market. 
Academic literature dating back from as far as the seventies has explored the use of a 
portfolio of real investments as an inflation hedge. Various asset classes such as 
equities (Z. Bodie 1976), commodities (Z. Bodie 1983), real estate (Rubens, Bond et 
Webb 2009), REITS (Park, Mullineaux et Chew 1990), and more recently dividend 
indices(Barclays Capital Research 2008) have been examined as potential real hedges 
to inflation. Even exotic assets such as forest assets (Washburn et Binkley 1993) and 
farmland (Newell et Lincoln 2009) just to mention two of them have also been 
explored but offer very limited interest with respect to the added complexity their 
investment requires. 
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 The first emission of a long term CPI linked bond by a private US financial 
institution in the late eighties has led to a string of papers starting with (Z. Bodie 
1990) which aimed at finding the optimal strategic asset mix these new assets 
enabled. Similarly, the first issuance by the United States treasury of inflation 
protected securities in 1997, following the first issuance by the British treasury of 
inflation linked gilts in 1981 have generated a renewal of interest in their role as 
inflation risk mitigation and diversification assets. The latest of which is the (Brière 
and Signori 2010) paper. These studies are of limited help for the purpose of this 
work as they still rely for a significant fraction of their investment strategies on 
inflation linked assets, which we are precisely trying to avoid doing. They 
nonetheless offer a first alternative to fully inflation protected investments, and 
therefore offer a potentially higher degree of returns, at the cost of a more hazardous 
hedging method. 
 Another stream of academic literature has focused on the optimal allocation for 
inflation hedging portfolios using only nominal assets and using various approaches 
to determine the optimal allocation like the recent (Amenc, Martellini et Ziemann 
2009) paper which devised a global unconstrained nominal inflation hedging portfolio 
that would use a Vector Error Correcting Model to determine the optimal ex-ante 
allocation of the various potential inflation hedging asset classes mentioned before. 
This kind of strategy would solve the availability problem of the inflation linked 
assets, but would fail to bring any kind of guaranteed value to the portfolio, be it in 
real or nominal terms, and because of that, fails to meet our Asset Liability 
Management (ALM) constraints. In fact, the hedging potential of all the above-
mentioned asset classes has proved to be horizon sensitive and dependent on the 
macroeconomic context. (Attié & Roache, 2009) have studied the time sensitivity of 
the inflation hedging potential of various asset classes and have shown in particular 
that some asset classes like commodities react better to unexpected inflation shocks 
than others, like most obviously nominal bond. More generally, the inflation betas 
has also proved to be unstable over time and can exhibit strong local decorrelations, 
rendering the inflation hedging exercise risky considering for example that the 
volatility of most of these asset classes is far superior to that of the Consumer Price 
Index we are precisely trying to hedge. 
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inflation indexed products use and would therefore not solve our availability problem, 
without even taking into account the low real returns these strategies would probably 
yield. 
 Using a call option on nominal assets, as opposed to real assets, would only 
partly solve the problem as the risk-free part is either made of zero coupon bonds 
which are available in limited supply or synthetic bonds made of nominal zero 
coupon bonds combined with a zero coupon inflation index swap which have greater 
supply but very low real returns. It could also be envisaged to combine a risk free 
zero coupon nominal bond and an out of the money call option on inflation. It would 
almost exactly be a replication of an inflation index bond as we will explain in the 
next subsection. 
 A last possibility would involve the transposition of the CPPI technique of 
(Black et Jones 1987) in the real world by using the above mentioned techniques to 
dynamically manage a cushion of inflation indexed bond and a portfolio of real return 
yielding assets. As was mentioned before, this strategy would still rely on indexed 
assets. The inflation hedging portfolio insurance problem would therefore be solved 
without investing in inflation linked assets or derivatives if it were possible to 
generate a portfolio that could mimic the cash-flows of an inflation-linked-bond as 
we will try to prove in the next subsection. 
 To sum up, any real portfolio insurance strategy would involve a capital 
guaranteeing part and a real performance seeking investment made of a diversified 
portfolio or a derivative and without explicit capital guarantees at maturity. 
Depending on the strategy used, the guaranteed capital part would either have a real 
guarantee embedded, or simply a nominal guarantee which would have to be 
complemented by a real guarantee attained to the detriment of the performance 
seeking part. 
 Trying to do without the IL instruments, we want to replicate the cash flow of 
an ILB with a Fisher Hypothesis. This replication can be achieved using an adapted 
OBPI technique as mentioned in the previous subsection and the theoretical 
justification is provided below: 
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Replicating the cash flows of an ILB is equivalent to fully hedging a nominal 
portfolio on a real basis. To do so, we need to invest a fraction α of the notional of 
the portfolio N in a zero coupon nominal bond of rate τ଴,୘୒  and buy a cap to hedge the 
residual risk. Out of simplicity, N is assumed hereunder to have a unit value. Using 
the Fisher framework (Fisher 1907), we can decompose the nominal bond’s rate into 
a real rate τ଴,୘ୖ , an inflation anticipation ॱ଴൫π଴,୲൯ and an inflation premium p଴൫π଴,୲൯	: 
1 ൅ τ଴,୘୒ ൌ ൫1 ൅ τ଴,୘ୖ ൯ ቀ1 ൅ ॱ଴൫π଴,୘൯ቁ ቀ1 ൅ p଴൫π଴,୘൯ቁ 
The nominal bond’s allocation α should then be defined such that its inflation 
components equalize the ILB’s one. We obtain the following equation by ignoring the 
cross product : 
α ቀ1 ൅ ॱ଴൫π଴,୘൯ቁ ቀ1 ൅ p଴൫π଴,୘൯ቁ ൌ 	ቀ1 ൅ ॱ଴൫π଴,୘൯ቁ 					⇒ 				α ൌ 11 ൅ p଴൫π଴,୘൯ 
We are left with a residual amount ሺ1 െ αሻ out of which we can buy the option 
without shorting. 
Let π଴,୘୰  be the realized inflation between 0 and T, let S଴ be the initial spot rate for 
inflation equal to ॱ଴൫π଴,୘൯ under the rational expectation hypothesis and let c଴,୘	;	୏ be 
the cap premia of strike K and maturity T at 0 be expressed as a percentage of the 
notional.  
By a simple absence of arbitrage opportunity hypothesis, we can rule out ITM strikes: 
∄K ൑ S଴		such	that		c଴,୘	;	୏ 	൑ 	 ሺ1 െ αሻ 
When short selling is also prohibited, we have strikes that are OTM or at best ATM. 
This would constitute a partial hedge in which we would remain at risk on the spread: 
Residual	Risk	 ൌ 	 ൜ െሺK െ S୘ሻା, if	S୘ 	∈ ሾS଴, Kሿ0				otherwise																																											 
If we can borrow at rate τ଴,୘୆୒, we can then fully hedge our portfolio. Ignoring the cross 
products, we obtain under those assumptions the nominal return Nୖ: 
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Nୖ ൌ α	τ଴,୘ୖ 	൅ ॱ଴൫π଴,୘൯ 	൅	ቀπ଴,୘୰ 	െ	ॱ଴൫π଴,୘൯ቁ
ା 	െ	൫1 െ α െ c଴,୘	;	ୗబ൯൫1 ൅ τ଴,୘୆୒൯
୘
 
The real return	Rୖ is thus: 
Rୖ ൌ α	τ଴,୘ୖ 	൅ ॱ଴൫π଴,୘൯ 	൅ ቀπ଴,୘୰ 	െ	ॱ଴൫π଴,୘൯ቁ
ା 	െ	൫1 െ α െ c଴,୘	;	ୗబ൯൫1 ൅ τ଴,୘୆୒൯
୘ െ π଴,୘୰  
Applying the cap-floor parity, we have : 
ॱ଴൫π଴,୘൯ 	െ π଴,୘୰ ൅ ቀπ଴,୘୰ 	െ	ॱ଴൫π଴,୘൯ቁ
ା ൌ ൫ॱ଴൫π଴,୘൯ െ π଴,୘୰ ൯ା 
Which gives us the following result for the real rate: 
Rୖ ൌ 	α	τ଴,୘ୖ 	൅	൫ॱ଴൫π଴,୘൯ െ π଴,୘୰ ൯ା ൅	൫1 െ α െ c଴,୘	;	ୗబ൯൫1 ൅ τ଴,୘୆୒൯
୘
 
Nota bene:  This return is not necessarily positive.  
 In fact, since call options on inflation are not liquid exchange-traded 
instruments but OTC products, there is a high probability that the call premium would 
be sufficiently high to render the real return of the strategy very low at best if not 
negative at worst. This is not inconsistent with empirical observations that have been 
made on real bonds: some TIPS issuances in 2010 have had negative real rates. 
 The replication of the ILB cash flows by a combination of a nominal bond and a 
call option on inflation still fails to fully satisfy our objective of getting rid of the 
dependency on the inflation financial market because of the call option. To relax this 
constraint, it might be possible to manage the option in a gamma trading strategy 
without having to outrightly buy the derivative. The obvious challenge to overcome is 
that the natural underlying of the call option is an inflation indexed security, which 
brings us back to our previous hurdle. To overcome this latest challenge, it could be 
possible to envisage a cross-hedging trading strategy to gamma hedge the call on 
purely nominal underlings as will be exposed in the next subsection. (Brennan et Xia 
2002) proposed a purely nominal static strategy that would both replicate a zero 
coupon real bond and invest the residual fraction of the portfolio in equity while 
taking into account the horizon and the risk aversion of the investor in a finite 
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therefore reduce the inflation hedging potential of nominal floating rate asset, which, 
though not capped as in fixed rate assets, will still fail to hedge entirely the inflation 
risk. The residual part of this risk has to be hedged away by incorporating the real 
guarantee in the diversified part of the portfolio which is made up of potential 
inflation hedging asset classes which we will limit to three: equities, commodities and 
REITS. Subsequent work could exploit a finer distinction between commodities by 
dividing them in for example four sub-classes: soft, industrial metals, precious metals 
and energy. The tactical allocation of the portfolio will be made according to a 
systematic algorithm which doesn’t allow for asset manager input as a first step. 
Eventually a more complex asset allocation algorithm could be added. We assume, as 
in the portfolio insurance literature, that there is no credit risk in either one of the 
fixed income assets we hold.  The value at maturity of these assets is therefore their 
full notional value. We do not assume any outright hypothesis on the guaranteed 
value-at-maturity for the diversification asset, but as in any CPPI strategy, a 
maximum resilience has to be set at a desired level which we will denote	ߤ. The 
parameter could be set specifically for each asset class, but we will assume only a 
single one for simplicity. 
If we add a martingale hypothesis for the price process ௧ܲ 	of the other asset 
classes: 
௧ܲାఏ ൌ ॱ௧ሺ ௧ܲሻ 
 This “limited liability” assumption becomes equivalent to a value-at-maturity 
hypothesis for the diversified portfolio which we can write for ܩ ்ܲ being the 
guaranteed value at maturity: 
ॱ௧ሺܩ ்ܲሻ ൌ ߤ ∙ ௧ܲ 
By further assuming that expected inflation can be obtained by the use of BEIs 
derived from ZCIIS, we can compute the initial fixed income fraction of the DIHTS 
which we will denote	ߙ଴.  
Let ߨ௧,௧ାఛ௥  be the realized inflation between t and t+	߬, and let ߨ௧,௧ାఛ௘ ఏ be the 
expected inflation between t and t+	߬ at time	ߠ. We have: 
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ߨ௧,௧ାఛ௥ ൌ ߨ௧,௧ାఛ௘ ఏ ൅ ߝ௧,௧ାఛ 
Let’s further assume that: 
∀ߠ ൏ ݐ, ॱఏ൫ߝ௧,௧ାఛ൯ ൌ 0 
We then assume that: 
ߨ௧,௧ାఛ௘ ఏ ൌ ܤܧܫ௧,௧ାఛఏ 
This assumption simplifies the problem of the computation of the inflation 
expectation in a rational anticipation framework: since in the Fisher framework we 
have: 
ቀ1 ൅ ܤܧܫ௧,௧ାఛఏቁ ൌ ቀ1 ൅ ߨ௧,௧ାఛ௘ ఏቁ ൬1 ൅ ݌ఏ ቀߨ௧,௧ାఛ௘ ఏቁ൰ 
The above assumption is equivalent to considering that the risk premiums are nil, 
which is a prudent hypothesis since they are non-negative: we therefore never 
underestimate the inflation risk. This hypothesis will have a further justification when 
we’ll discuss the definition of the DIHTS’ floor. 
 The use of DIHTS in an ALM strategy as it is presented here is better fitting for 
long term investors who wish to diversify away from zero-coupons inflation 
derivatives yielding back in bullet both the inflated principal and the real 
performance at maturity. It would be better fitting for retail oriented asset managers 
or pension funds. Investors wishing to diversify away from year-on-year type of 
inflation derivatives would rather use a strategy which cash flow profile still matches 
that of their liabilities which could for example require that the instrument pays the 
accrued inflation on the notional, and eventually a real coupon, on a yearly basis such 
that the instrument is at a yearly real par. Such strategies would benefit from an 
enhanced version of DIHTS using couponed bonds and eventually CMS-like fixed 
income derivatives in overlay to replicate our targeted benchmark instrument while 
still exploiting the same general principal as for the simpler strategy presented here. 
Henceforth, we will focus only on bullet repaying strategies since the marking-to-
market allows us to theoretically adjust the notional of the fund at a current value, 
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therefore without risking incurring a loss in case of partial or total redemption from 
the fund. 
As previously defined, 	ߙ  denotes the fraction of the fund invested in risk free nominal 
assets. Let ሺ	ߙ଴, 1 െ 	ߙ଴ሻ be the initial global allocation of the DIHTS and NPV denotes the 
net present value of the two fractions. All rates from now on are given in annual rate. At 
inception:  
ሺ1 െ α଴ሻ ∙ μ ൅ α଴ ൌ ቆ1 ൅ π଴,୘
ୣ
1 ൅ τ଴,୘୒ ቇ
୘
 
We therefore have 
α଴ ൌ ൭ቆ1 ൅ π଴,୘
ୣ
1 ൅ τ଴,୘୒ ቇ
୘
െ μ൱ 11 െ μ 
Let Α୲,୘ represent the ZC zero coupon bonds fraction of equivalent tenor (T-t), 
invested at time t and maturing at time T (for a ZCNB, only the nominal at maturity 
counts): 
Let NAV୲୞େ୒୆represent the NAV of the zero coupon part, we have: 
NAV୲୞େ୒୆ ൌ Α୲,୘൫1 ൅ τ୲,୘୒ ൯୘ି୲
 
Let ߱௧ be the weights of the ex-ante optimal allocation of the diversified portfolio, let 
Ω୲ be the vector of the value of the assets of the portfolio and let	 ௧ܲ be the price vector of 
the selected asset classes. From now on, the star will denote the post optimization value of 
the parameter. We have at inception: 
߱଴∗ ൌ Ω଴
∗
1 െ ߙ଴ 
1 െ ߙ଴ ൌ 	߱଴∗ᇱ ∙ ଴ܲ	 
We then define ܰܣ ௧ܸ௉்ிas: 
ܰܣ ௧ܸ௉்ி ൌ Ω୲ିଵ∗ ′ ∙ ௧ܲ௧ܲିଵ 
And ܰܣ ௧ܸ௅௕as: 
ܰܣ ௧ܸ௅௕ ൌ ൫1 ൅ ߨ଴,௧
௥ ൯௧൫1 ൅ ߨ௧,்௘ ൯்ି௧
൫1 ൅ ߬଴,்ே ൯்ି௧
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For any	ݐ ൐ 0, we define the net asset value of the strategy	ܰܣ ௧ܸ: 
ܰܣ ௧ܸ ൌ ܰܣ ௧ܸ௉்ி ൅ ܰܣ ௧ܸ௓஼ே஻ െ ܰܣ ௧ܸ௅௕ 
Before any reallocation we have: 
ߙ௧ ൌ ܰܣ ௧ܸ
௓஼ே஻
ܰܽݒ௧௉்ி ൅ ܰܽݒ௧௓஼ே஻ 
Let	ܰܣܸீ௧ be the implicitly guaranteed net asset value of the strategy taking into 
account the loss resilience parameter	ߤ: 
																				
	ܰܣܸீ௧ ൌ ߤ ∙ ܰܣ ௧ܸ௉்ி ൅ ܰܣ ௧ܸ௓஼ே஻ െ ܰܣ ௧ܸ௅௕ 
The strategy remains viable as long as	ܰܣ ௧ܸ ൐ 0. If the floor is breached, the fund 
is closed before the maturity or a zero coupon inflation hedging security would have 
to be bought at a loss. 
A global reallocation is necessary if	ܰܣܸீ௧ ൏ 0 and in which case, we have to add 
a new trench of ZCNB such that: 
ߙ௧∗ ൌ argminఈ೟
ሼܰܣܸீ௧ሺߙ௧ሻ ൐ 0ሽ 
In case we have: 
ܰܣܸீ௧ሺ0ሻ ൐ 0				we	set				ߙ௧ ൌ 0 
Since the expected returns on the diversified part of the portfolio are potentially 
higher than those on the fixed income part, we set ߙ at the lowest possible value that 
verifies	ܰܣܸீ௧ ൐ 0. In order not to reallocate constantly the global parameter at the 
slightest market movement, we set a tolerance parameter ߟ under which no global 
reallocation is done: 
ߙ௧∗ ൌ ߙ௧				݂݅			|ܰܣܸீ௧| ൏ ߟ		݋ݎ	݂݅		ߙ௧ ൌ 0	ܽ݊݀	ܰܣܸீ௧ ൐ 0 
Obviously, any global reallocation would trigger a reallocation of the diversified 
portfolio weights. It is a sufficient but not necessary condition as it may be more 
optimal to do so more frequently as we will expose in the next subsection. 
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  The MV optimization criterion is defined by the following loss function ܮ at time 
t: 
ܮெ௏൫ݐ, ߱ெ௏௧, തܴ, ߨ௞௘, ॱ௧ሺܴሻ, Σ୲൯ ൌ ߱ெ௏௧ᇱ ∙ Σ୲ ∙ ߱ெ௏௧ 
We therefore obtain the optimal portfolio according to the MV criterion by 
minimizing L: 
߱ெ௏௧∗ ൌ argminఠಾೇ೟
൛ܮெ௏൫ݐ, ߱ெ௏௧, ॱ௧ሺܴሻ, Σ୲൯ൟ 
The IR optimization criterion is defined such that: 
ܫܴ൫ݐ, ߱ூோ௧, തܴ, ߨ௞௘, ॱ௧ሺܴሻ, Σ୲, ܴ௧௓஼ே஻൯ 																																																																																																								
ൌ
߱ூோ௧ᇱ ∙ ॱ௧ሺ்ܴሻ െ തܴ െ ൫ߨ௧,்௥ െ ߨ௘்௧൯ െ 11 െ ߙ௧ ൫ߨ
௘்
௧ ൅ ߨ଴,௧௥ െ ߙ௧ ∙ ܴ௧௓஼ே஻൯
߱ூோ௧ᇱ ∙ Σ୲ ∙ ߱ூோ௧
 
We therefore obtain the optimal portfolio according to the IR criterion by 
maximizing the IR: 
߱ூோ௧∗ ൌ argmaxఠ಺ೃ೟
൛ܫܴ൫ݐ, ߱ூோ௧, തܴ, ߨ௞௘, ॱ௧ሺܴሻ, Σ୲, ܴ௧௓஼ே஻൯ൟ 
 The first criterion required at least the estimation of the variance-covariance 
matrix of the investable assets and the second one requires in addition the estimation 
of those average returns. The ex-post inflation forecasting error and therefore the 
shortfall probability are trickier to compute since they require for example a model to 
compute simulated trajectories and perform Monte-Carlo estimation. The CW method 
being blind, it is obviously the less demanding in term of input.  
 In the next section on empirical estimation, we will rely on historical 
estimations of the key optimization inputs out of simplicity considerations. 
Forecasting errors will be assumed to be nil (rational expectation hypothesis). A 
slightly more comprehensive approach to allocating our portfolio would involve the 
modeling of the joint distribution of inflation and investable assets from a macro or 
an econometric perspective in order to make forecasts (or simulations). 
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the longest available timeframe on US data spanning three decades from 1990 to the 
end of 2010. 
 Using the results from these portfolio simulations, we computed the Failure 
Rate (FR), the Information Ratio (IR) and the Turnover Ratio (ToR) for the different 
strategies. The FR is defined as the percentage of times a portfolios breaks the real 
par floor, the IR is the Sharpe ratio applied to a pure inflation benchmark and the ToR 
is the percentage of the initial value of the fund that is reallocated during the life of 
the strategy. To have a measure of the potential Profit and Loss (P&L) of the 
benchmark portfolio returns in case of failure of the DIHTS, we measure the P&L 
Given Failure (PLGF). Nota bene, this indicator is obviously measurable only if the 
DIHTS does fail. 
 For the three previously selected allocation methods,  we then tested the impact 
on the overall strategy performance on the choice of a shorter investment horizon 
based on our central scenario of µ = 50% and η = 1%. We then computed the 
sensitivity analysis of the DIHTS to the choice of µ and η in our 10 year investment 
horizon base scenario (results presented in the working paper version). We also 
plotted the comparative real return profile of the DIHTS compared to the benchmark 
portfolio allocated with the same technique for various investment horizons in our 
baseline scenario. Eventually, we constructed an efficient frontier based on our real 
return compared to a risk measure (the volatility of the NAV). 
 The various portfolios values were computed on end-of-period values at a 
monthly frequency obtained from the Bloomberg data services: for the diversified and 
benchmark portfolios the S&P-GSCI-TR total return commodity index, the S&P500-
TR total return broad US equity index, the FTSE-NAREIT-TR traded US real estate 
total return index and the Barclays Capital Long U.S. Treasury Index (the last being 
only for the benchmark portfolio). For our zero-coupon and mark-to-market 
computation, we used the US sovereign ZC-coupon curve computed also by 
Bloomberg. CPI inflation was measured using the standard official measure. The 
longest overlapping availability period for all of these data stretches from 1988 to 
2011.  
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 The main drawback of this study is that reallocations are done at no trading 
costs. The performance indicated here is in effect purely theoretical. This is why the 
ToR ratios are computed in order to have an idea of the potential trading cost 
implications. On this aspect, the DIHTS does underperform its benchmark portfolio 
by a relatively small measure, even if this conclusion has to be nuanced by the large 
and relatively higher volatility of the ToR for the DIHTS compared to its benchmark. 
The choice of our baseline scenario is comforted by the parameter sensitivity analysis 
which clearly indicates that a conservative estimate for µ = 50% reduces failure rates 
at the 10 year horizon tested. 
Table 1: Horizon sensitivity of the DIHTS vs. the Benchmark Portfolio for the historical simulation 
allocated by IR. 
 
 
Table 2: Allocation horizon sensitivity analysis for the DIHTS for the historical simulation 
allocated by IR. 
 
DIHTS PTF DIHTS PTF DIHTS PTF
59,48% 24,35% 7,17% 7,36%
(30,2%) (32,65%) (3,2%) (1,39%)
48,70% 22,55% 8,91% 9,30%
(26,2%) (20,50%) (3,5%) (1,75%)
38,41% 20,82% 10,29% 11,45%
(18,3%) (11,31%) (3,9%) (2,03%)
32,06% 18,42% 11,18% 13,57%
(13,6%) (10,61%) (3,9%) (2,03%)
29,30% 15,91% 12,08% 15,87%
(13,6%) (9,53%) (3,7%) (2,10%)
25,56% 13,89% 13,33% 18,55%
(12,4%) (7,95%) (3,5%) (2,36%)
10 0,00% 7,52%
8 0,00% 8,28%
9 0,00% 9,66%
6 0,00% 21,55%
7 0,00% 9,47%
Horizon 
(Years)
Fail Rate IR ToR
5 0,00% 20,73%
Horizon 
(Years) ZCN SPX REIT GSCI
31,6% 32,2% 19,8% 14,7%
(22,2%) (16,5%) (12,9%) (10,9%)
29,0% 33,6% 20,3% 15,7%
(19,7%) (14,4%) (10,9%) (9,2%)
25,9% 35,2% 20,6% 17,2%
(16,4%) (11,5%) (8,3%) (7,3%)
22,7% 36,8% 21,2% 18,3%
(12,9%) (8,7%) (6,9%) (6,8%)
20,3% 38,0% 22,4% 18,3%
(9,8%) (6,9%) (7,1%) (7,8%)
17,8% 39,3% 23,8% 18,3%
(6,9%) (7,1%) (8,3%) (9,4%)
5
6
7
8
9
10
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The tolerance parameter η = 1% impact seems to be of lesser importance but it is 
clear the ToR versus FR arbitrage could be of significance had trading costs been 
accounted for as can be seen in tables 4 to 6. The CW allocation is rather surprisingly 
less ToR intensive compared to the other allocation methods but achieves lower IR 
performance. This could be attributed to the volatility of the estimation of future 
expected returns and volatility which require important shifts in allocation. 
 
Figure 8: Performance comparison for the historical simulation allocated by IR 
 
 
Figure 9: Efficient frontier estimation for the historical simulation allocated by IR 
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 The graphical representation of the comparative real performance of the strategy 
at medium maturities as can be seen in figure 4 appears to show the classical CPPI 
“call-like” optional risk profile in which the strategies holds in tough times whilst 
potentially achieving higher returns in favorable ones. As fewer negative results are 
experienced for longer investment horizons, the risk profile is less clear to establish 
but is consistent with the previous analysis in the IR case. The analysis of our 
empirical determination of the real efficient frontier of our strategy reinforces the 
previous conclusions as to the relative efficacy of the DIHTS in medium term and its 
less clear performance gains for longer horizons as can be seen in figure 5: at the five 
years horizon, the DIHTS frontier is systematically shifted towards the upper left 
corner compared to its benchmark whist at the ten year horizon, it is shifted to the left 
in the IR case.  
 
Figure 10: Mean dynamic allocation for the historical simulation of the DIHTS allocated by IR 
 
 
 Consistently with our prior findings, we actually observe in the baseline 
scenario a better performance for the IR than with the MV and even better 
performance compared to the CW in term of achieved IR. It is therefore interesting to 
note that the DIHTS, with its conditional allocation does offer better than expected 
results in the most favorable circumstances, which is very uncommon in the plain 
vanilla derivative instruments it is supposedly mimicking. To sum up, the DIHTS 
achieves inflation hedging and delivers real returns in all the backtest simulations for 
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algorithm of (Politis et White 2004) with its associated Matlab code written by Dr. 
Andrew Patton from the LSE, we generate a new set of trajectories by integrating the 
resulting series of return blocks. This technique would partially preserve the 
correlation structure of our time series which are by nature strongly dependent. The 
obvious shortfall of this approach is that some intrinsic adjustment mechanisms could 
take place at a horizon way too great to be captured by the bootstrapped which has to 
be of limited length to ensure a sufficient range of scenari. To stress test the 
resilience of the strategy, we simulated 200 times a 20 year bootstrapped vector time 
series. Out of this 4000 year of simulated scenari, we ran for each of the 200 paths 
from 120 to 180 different 5 to 10 year portfolio simulations. As in the previous 
section on historical backtesting, we presented the results of this exercise on graphic 
format and tables summarizing the comparative performances, and the average 
allocation of the portfolio. 
 
Figure 11: Example of a joint simulation of nominal rates and inflation using block bootstrapping 
 
 
 Out of the universes of scenari we generated, some will be extraordinarily 
adverse. It is worth mentioning that since those scenari are obtained from real past 
returns, they do constitute credible “black swans” events worse evaluating, especially 
since recent turmoil have taught us that such improbable events do actually occur 
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DIHTS but reassuringly, the PLGF is also negative, indicating that the benchmark 
would probably haven’t fared better in such adverse environments. We also observe a 
significant number of DIHTS simulations which end-up below the real floor at 
maturity whilst they never broke the real floor during their lifetime up to the before-
last valuation of their mark-to-market. Since this represents the gap risk resulting 
from the mark-to-market at a low frequency (monthly here), we have included those 
cases in the computation of the failed rate. Moving to higher frequency estimation 
would probably eliminate much if not all of these below zero points as in the 
conventional CPPI. 
 
Figure 12: Performance comparison for the bootstrapped simulation allocated by IR. 
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Figure 13: Efficient frontier estimation for the bootstrapped simulation allocated by IR. 
 
 
 Looking then at the efficient frontier empirical estimation, we have once again 
as in the previous case better results for the five year with frontiers pushed to the 
northwest for all the allocation methods. For the ten year cases, there seems to be no 
significant difference between the efficient frontiers of the benchmark portfolio and 
the DIHTS but for the very adverse cases as before. Nota bene: the efficient frontiers 
of the DIHTS passes through the (0,0) point  because in case of a breach of the real 
par, the strategies are terminated and an arbitrary (0,0) return variance couple is 
entered. 
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Figure 14: Mean dynamic allocation for the historical simulation of the DIHTS allocated by IR. 
 
 
Figure 15 : Horizon sensitivity of the (DIHTS – Benchmark) Fail Rate enhancement  
 
 
 The average allocation of the portfolio shows a progressive substitution of the 
nominal bond to the benefit of the other asset classes which exhibit upward trending 
means for all classes in the five year computation. In the case of the ten year horizon, 
the REIT allocation exhibits a downward trend in the MV allocation and so does the 
GSCI in the IR allocation. There is no clear explanation for these phenomena.  
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Table 3: Horizon sensitivity of the DIHTS vs. the Benchmark Portfolio for the bootstrapped 
simulation allocated by IR 
 
 
Table 4: Allocation horizon sensitivity analysis for the DIHTS for the bootstrapped simulation. 
 
 In term of comparative performance to the benchmark, we have computed the 
excess rate of failure of the DIHTS over its benchmark for the three allocation 
methods for horizons ranging from 5 to 10 years. The results are presented in the 
figure 2 above. We observe that in term of FR, the DIHTS achieves a significant 
reduction for maturities ranging from 5 to 7 years and then underperforms its 
benchmark significantly for maturities of 8 years and over.  
 The PLGFs do seem to follow the same pattern as they exhibit fairly negative 
figures for short maturities and tend to diminish as the maturity lengthens. They end 
up close to zero for the CW and MV case and remain negative for the IR which is the 
Horizon 
(Years) 
Fail Rate  IR  ToR  PLGF 
DIHTS  PTF  DIHTS  PTF  DIHTS  PTF 
5  9,93%  16,17%  56,05%  51,79%  8,10%  6,17%  ‐7,03% 
(21,4%)  (19,95%)  (4,9%)  (2,38%)  (13,31%) 
6  10,55%  14,19%  45,52%  47,95%  9,13%  7,79%  ‐5,82% 
(18,8%)  (21,36%)  (4,9%)  (3,02%)  (12,81%) 
7  8,83%  12,24%  25,64%  31,05%  10,66%  9,37%  ‐5,92% 
(15,2%)  (21,26%)  (5,3%)  (3,77%)  (14,60%) 
8  9,63%  8,70%  29,69%  32,00%  11,68%  11,27%  ‐1,01% 
(9,0%)  (9,78%)  (6,1%)  (4,69%)  (12,55%) 
9  13,33%  10,55%  22,52%  21,03%  13,26%  13,63%  ‐4,56% 
(6,2%)  (4,92%)  (6,6%)  (5,61%)  (12,93%) 
10  12,14%  8,60%  4,94%  4,89%  15,44%  16,14%  ‐2,09% 
(7,0%)  (6,91%)  (8,2%)  (7,61%)  (13,75%) 
 
Horizon \ 
Allocation ZCN SPX REIT GSCI 
5  17,3% 22,5% 35,5% 21,6%
(10,7%) (5,7%) (6,1%) (6,6%) 
6  17,1% 22,9% 35,7% 21,4%
(10,2%) (5,9%) (5,9%) (6,4%) 
7  15,9% 21,9% 37,0% 22,7%
(8,7%) (6,3%) (6,5%) (6,9%) 
8  15,8% 25,3% 35,9% 20,1%
(7,5%) (5,7%) (5,8%) (6,1%) 
9  14,9% 24,8% 35,9% 20,4%
(5,8%) (5,5%) (5,7%) (6,1%) 
10  14,5% 23,2% 36,3% 21,3%
(5,0%) (5,5%) (5,7%) (5,9%) 
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overall best performer. The IR ratios yield little discriminative value as the 
differences between the ones of the DIHTS and those of its benchmark are negligible. 
The ToRs are also fairly close, but it is rather encouraging as it removes partly the 
trading cost caveat. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 Inflation hedging has been a broad cyclical concern in Asset Liability 
Management for almost every type of financial institution and states alike. Be it for 
hedging on the short or the long part of the curve depending on their type of 
liabilities, virtually every player has had to grapple with an unbalanced market and all 
the costs and liquidity problems associated with it. Three decades of development of 
the primary inflation linked market have failed to quench the demand for inflation 
linked securities as its growth has been largely outpaced by the one of the potential 
demand for such instruments, adding extra pressure on hedgers. Recent spikes in 
headline inflation in OECD countries have spurred once again the quest for 
alternative hedging techniques as many sovereign issuers, constituting the bulk of the 
emitters, might rethink their emission policies. Some have already done so in the face 
of growing servicing cost and mounting public debt, the enduring testimony of the 
2008-2009 financial crises. 
 This paper presents a novel way of hedging inflation without having to use 
inflation linked securities or other kind of derivatives through the transposition of a 
classic portfolio insurance strategy called CPPI. The Dynamic Inflation Hedging 
Strategy offers the promise of an implicitly guaranteed real par value for the portfolio 
whilst also delivering real returns at a much lower cost than comparative inflation-
linked strategies would offer. The first empirical backtesting results of the potential 
of the DIHTS obtained for a set of US data have showed encouraging results. With 
conservative parameter choice, the strategy delivers on its promises and never breaks 
the floor at any investment horizon and for any of the thousands of overlapping 
periods tested. The strategy is able to save the par value in rough markets conditions 
and delivers strong real performance in more auspicious ones. 
  
- 60 - 
 In the light of the results obtained by running a simulation exercise using a 
bootstrapping method with all the caveats before mentioned, we can reasonably 
upheld the rather optimistic results obtained in the historical simulation back-testing 
as we are able to prove a significant outperformance of the DIHTS over its 
benchmark in term of rate of failure for horizons of five to seven years, whilst it 
unfortunately suffers greater losses for longer targeted maturities. Contrary to our 
first estimation, the bootstrapping simulation exercises shows that the DIHTS can fail 
in cases of extremely adverse scenari, the like of which we have never seen before 
though. 
 Further work on this subject might involve taking on the most severe caveat of 
this study: the absence of trading cost. The exceptionally strong performance of the 
strategy clearly demonstrates the need to take them into account in a realistic way. It 
is a an especially difficult problem since the length of the period studied would force 
the use of time varying trading cost as markets have evolved dramatically in  recent 
times, especially since the early nineties in terms of liquidity and trading costs. 
Another aspect that could be envisaged would be to run the experiment on better 
simulation universes if they were to materialize since the back-testing bootstrapping 
techniques suffer from important caveats. It is especially important as the period 
studied in the historical simulation involves mostly decreasing inflation and risk 
premiums which tend to biases upward our results. Eventually, it could also be 
possible to enhance the allocation by incorporating more advanced models into the 
framework or using predictive allocation variables to market-time the alternative 
asset classes. The breakdown of the general asset classes we are investing on into 
more subtle sub-indexes might also yield enhanced performance in term of tracking 
error of the CPI. 
 To conclude, this paper does successfully proves that transposing systematic 
trading rules to achieve a real portfolio insurance through the use of the DIHTS is 
both feasible and generates higher real returns that a classic portfolio approach 
benchmark would. The framework developed here is also sufficiently flexible to 
allow for asset managers input in term of tactical allocation for the diversified part of 
the portfolio. Obviously, the strategy would still suffer from the main shortfall of the 
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CPPI, as it only insures a hedge up to a certain level of negative performance. The 
gain in term of real return come at a cost: there is “no free lunch” for “black swans”
 Fulli-Lemaire Nicolas | Thèse de doctorat | Janvier 2013
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Chapter 2, Allocating Commodities in Inflation Hedging 
Portfolios: A Core Driven Global Macro Strategy 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The intricate relationship between crude oil prices and macroeconomic variables, 
inflation in particular, has been extensively studied in the last decade. Following the 
seminal work of (Blanchard & Gali, 2007), it has been commonly accepted that the 
pass-through of exogenous oil price shocks to output and inflation has greatly 
diminished since the nineties, thereby severely reducing their role as drivers of long-
term inflation and economic crisis. Moreover, (Clark et Terry 2010) and (van den 
Noord et André 2007) have shown that the transmission of oil price shocks into core 
inflation has now basically ceased, thereby greatly differentiating the behavior of 
core and headline inflation. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, no research paper has 
focused precisely on the implications in terms of commodity allocation for inflation 
hedging portfolio management that this macroeconomic shift implies. 
 The question of the optimal allocation of commodities in an inflation hedging 
portfolio has been central to academic research since the end of the era of cheap oil in 
the seventies in the United States. The first article directly addressing this issue was 
(Bodie & Rosansky, 1980) which advocates the inclusion of commodities as natural 
inflation hedges. Commodities can be included in a standard portfolio optimization 
framework for two main reasons: firstly, commodities have offered potentially strong 
nominal returns and are a source of performance enhancement on a risk-adjusted 
basis as they are potentially decorrelated from other standard asset classes. Secondly, 
commodities seem to offer interesting inflation hedging properties. Yet, commodities 
are cyclical and can suffer from very sharp downturns, of magnitudes that greatly 
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dwarf inflation variations, thus rendering their inclusion into inflation hedging 
portfolios non-trivial. 
 The mainstream of academic literature over recent decades has been made up of 
response function analysis following the seminal work of (Campbell & Viceira, 2002) 
which introduced the use of structural Vector Autoregressive Models (VAR) allowing 
the computation of response functions to inflationary shocks, regime change or more 
complex scenarios in the case of Markov Switching models. It has recently expanded 
into the co-integration universe with the use of Vector Error Correction Models 
(Amenc, Martellini et Ziemann 2009). Though such works may offer some interesting 
insights, their statistical justification is quite weak and their out of sample efficiency 
remains to be proved. In fact, such models do not try to exploit the relationship 
between commodity price shocks and inflation but rather tend to measure the 
potential unexpected-inflation hedging resilience of an asset class, were such an event 
to occur. 
 Since no publicly available, global macro approach using pass-through literature 
to allocate commodities has been proposed, we investigate this issue in this article: 
we will attempt to define a natural commodity allocation derived from their expected 
contribution to headline inflation trends using forward core values as an allocation 
metric. The first section of the article will be dedicated to a review of the literature 
concerning changes in the pass-through, its measurement and commodity allocation 
research. The second section will investigate the impacts of this shift into financial 
securities’ pricing and correlation structure, then propose strategies aimed at 
exploiting them. Finally, the last section will evaluate three possible exploitations of 
our findings: a strategic allocation framework, a tactical allocation framework and a 
commodities and fixed income derivative arbitrage. 
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Gregorio, Landerretche, & Neilson, 2007) extend the (Blanchard & Gali, 2007) paper 
by incorporating a much larger set of 34 countries, including emerging ones and 
estimate the pass-through using IRFs derived from an SVAR analysis and an 
enhanced Philips curve with oil parameters. They conclude that it has fallen 
significantly since the mid-seventies for all developed countries and, to a smaller 
extent, in emerging markets. This reduction has been the result of both a decline in 
the economic intensity of oil use and the impact of favorable exchange rates as the 
latest oil shock has been demand-driven (therefore resulting in an appreciation of 
exporting countries’ currencies). Both of these new arguments still fail to explain a 
significant part of the reduction of the pass-through as the authors conclude. Using an 
equivalent methodology, (Chen, 2009) points out the degree of trade openness as the 
only statistically significant additional explanatory variable included in his analysis, 
but still fails to explain a large part of the pass-through decline. 
The other interesting aspect of this pass-through is the transmission of energy 
price variations from headline to core inflation. The oil-inflation paradigm previously 
exposed would have those variations reflected immediately in headline CPI and then 
progressively transferred into core CPI measures as economic agents gradually adapt 
their prices to a change in energy input prices. This transmission mechanism would 
end-up closing the gap between both indicators. In essence, it would be a headline to 
core inflation pass-through. In fact, core CPI measures are often disregarded by 
financial professionals as merely lagged estimates of headline CPI. But as all 
paradigms seem doomed to fail, (van den Noord et André 2007) showed that during 
the recent crisis, core inflation’s reaction to headline spikes remained totally muted in 
both the US and Europe. Once again, the reduction in energy intensity is identified as 
the main explanation of this, but so is the fact that this recent crisis occurred at a time 
of economic slack compared to previous ones in the seventies in particular. (Clark et 
Terry 2010) went down this path using a more complex time-varying-parameters and 
stochastic-volatility-Bayesian-VAR methodology to precisely estimate the pass-
through of energy prices variations to core inflation in the US. They estimate that 
since approximately 1975, core CPI in the US had gradually become less responsive 
to changes in energy prices. By 1985, the pass-through had been reduced to nil. 
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Figure 16: Rolling time frame correlation analysis between commodities and inflation indices 
 
 
We plotted in Figure 1 those three measures for quarterly data over the 1975-2010 
period using a 20-quarter rolling time frame and using the GSCI-TR (the Goldman 
Sachs Total Return Commodity Index). From this first rough insight, we can grasp 
that the correlation between the commodity index and core inflation (dark blue 
dashed line) is on average quite low and unstable through time. The correlation 
between headline inflation and the commodity index (grey pointed line) is also 
unstable but secularly increasing over times, even though it is subject to brutal regime 
changes in terms of correlation levels. We can speculate that they appear to be 
synchronous with severe macro or oil specific events (or both) such as the 1985-86 
counter oil shock (Mabro, 1987) or the US 1992 recession (Hamilton, 2011). The 
correlation between the commodity index and the volatile fraction of the inflation 
index a.k.a. the headline vs. core spread (solid light blue line) has more or less been 
continuously rising since the mid-eighties and has risen above 80% in recent years.  
Its trend has been so closely linked to its headline counterpart that it has even gone up 
to the point of being indistinguishable from it in the last ten years. 
Consistently with prior literature, our computation exhibits a new correlation 
regime that began in the nineties: core inflation appears weakly correlated with 
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Or the pass-through doesn’t operate and the CI response to the spiking of 
commodities remains muted. If this were the case, CI would remain – ceteris paribus 
– flat while the HI should eventually mean revert towards CI. If this alternative 
scenario were true, then the joint evolution between CI and HI (both in level and in 
correlation to commodities) would also be a different indicator for the allocation: the 
CI-HI correlation should remain high throughout the cycle. If our objective is 
primarily an inflation hedge, then we should calibrate a strategic commodity 
allocation to correspond to the forecasted residual spread between CI and HI. 
 
Figure 17: Year on year headline minus core inflation over forty years 
 
 
Therefore, if the pass-through does operate, we should have a tactical allocation 
indicator whereas if it doesn’t, we should have a strategic allocation indicator. We 
shall evaluate those two options in the next section. In accordance with our prior 
hypothesis, we compute the tactical indicator as the integrated difference between the 
returns on CI and HI (light blue continuous line). We obtain Figure 2 by 
superimposing with a different axis the contemporaneous evolution of the GSCI_TR 
index (dark blue dashed line). We also separately represented the GSCI_TR prior to 
the inclusion of energy commodities in December 1982 (light grey dashed line) when 
their liquidity was deemed sufficient. 
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As could be expected from the correlation analysis, there seems to be no clear 
relation between those two time series up until the late nineties, when there are clear 
hints of comovements, if not an outright cointegration relationship. In fact, 
considering the methodology employed by the statistical body on the one hand, and 
the computation of the commodity index, it is not initially obvious that such a 
relationship could hold. We are de facto comparing a consumer price derived index to 
a financial market derivative transaction based index, both of which could easily 
answer to very different drivers: the GSCI_TR could be very sensitive to market 
manipulation or short-term adjustments, whereas the other index could be subject to 
seasonal effects (we chose not to use a seasonally adjusted indicator). 
 
Figure 18: A Comparison of the GSCI TR index and the integrated difference of CI and HI 
 
 
This kind of argument could also offer a tentative alternative explanation for the 
weak relationship early on in the period: at this moment in time, commodities 
financial markets were much less developed, more illiquid and trading costs were 
extremely high. Such events would put a serious drag on the returns of the GSCI_TR 
during much of the seventies and eighties whereas the consumer price index did not 
suffer from such disadvantages. 
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Firstly by testing over the entire sample, then on several sub-samples which represent 
our areas of interest. The choice of those breakpoints is derived from the pass-through 
literature, not an endogenous selection like (Andrews, 1993). 
We can therefore perform the regression analysis and test for spurious regressions 
using the Johansen Test as is presented in Table 2.As expected, the regression 
analysis yields a low Adjusted R² for the overall period studied and for the 1970-1995 
period. However, it gives a higher Adjusted R² for the 1995-2010 and the 2000-2010 
period. The last of the two periods’ R² is slightly smaller (contrary to our correlation 
analysis) partly because of the adjustment of the R² to the sample size (which is 
smaller in the second case). All the regressions are significant to the 99% threshold 
except for the first one over the entire 1970-2010 period. 
In order to check for long-term trends which would uphold the case for long-term 
stability, we check the validity of a cointegration hypothesis using a Johansen test. 
We first check for evidence of integration in our time series using the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test with constant and time trend whose results are exhibited in 
Table 1. The first and most unsurprising conclusion we have is that can we reject the 
null hypothesis (I(0)) for both our time series and at any period in time. Our result is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The second conclusion we can reach is that 
the process driving our two time series is almost perfectly integrated of order 1 since 
we obtain AR(1) parameter estimates insignificantly different from 1 in the case of 
the estimations with neither constants nor time-trends. If we include those 
parameters, as could have been expected, we obtain parameter estimates significantly 
different from 1, especially in the more recent estimates. 
As we expected, the cointegration hypothesis is upheld according to our Johansen 
Test for the 2000-2010 period and weakly rejected for the other sample periods. More 
precisely, we can reject the cointegration hypothesis for the 1970-2010 period at the 
95% level, and we upheld the hypothesis for the 2000-2010 period at the same level. 
For both the 1970-1995 and 1995-2010 period, we have weak evidences of 
cointegration (significant only at the 90% level). We can therefore conclude that 
according to our study, the cointegration seems to have begun in the early 2000 and is 
still holding today. It is consistent with literature on the macroeconomic model. We 
should therefore expect our strategic allocation strategy to perform better in a historic 
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backtest for the 2000-2010 timeframe and less so before that. Inversely, we should 
expect our tactical allocation to outperform in the preceding period and underperform 
in the more recent period. 
 
Table 1: Long-run equilibrium and cointegration test results 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable:
Range:
#Observations: 163 100 63 43
Independent Variables
Constant 1.024 1.041 0.967 0.971
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
GSCI_TR (x10^6) ‐1.907 ‐14.764 9.784 9.224
(x10^6) (0.956) (3.069) (0.740) (1.116)
Adj. R² 2.41% 19.10% 73.83% 61.91%
Fisher 3.981 ++ 23.136 +++ 174.875 +++ 68.267 +++
p‐value 0.048 5.5E‐06 1.1E‐19 2.4E‐10
Note :  +/++/+++ denotes the significance at the 90%/95%/99% level 
Johansen Test for constant plus time‐trend:
Statistic Null
Trace r< = 0 20.702 ** 8.863 10.494 10.908
r< = 1 2.645 3.460 * 3.458 * 5.218 **
Eigen r< = 0 18.057 ** 5.403 7.035 5.690
r< = 1 2.645 3.460 * 3.458 * 5.218 **
Core Headline Inflation Indicator
Note :  */**/*** denotes the significance at the 90%/95%/99% level using critical values 
generated using MacKinnon (1994, 1996)
1970‐2010 1970‐1995 1995‐2010 2000‐2010
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To perform the backtesting of our proposed strategic allocation we used fixed-
income and commodity data obtained from Bloomberg. Inflation data were retrieved 
from the FRED database. We use forecasted core inflation data either obtained from 
the survey of professional forecasters when it is available or computed using a very 
conservative hypothesis of stability in level and a term-structure shaped by the 
headline forward curve when it is not. We use only information available at the time 
of the investment to avoid “back-trading” or data mining biases. This dataset is 
available only from 1990 onward, thus constraining us.  
The zero coupon bond whose maturity matches our target investment one is 
allocated such that it terminal value equals the expected core-inflated value of our 
investment fraction of the portfolio. Let CI be the forecasted core inflation and ߬଴,௧௓஼ே 
be the zero coupon nominal rate, we can therefore write the fixed income allocation 
as: 
ܨܫ଴,௧ ൌ ቆ1 ൅ ܥܫ଴,௧1 ൅ ߬଴,௧௓஼ேቇ
௧
 
 
Tableau 6: A commodity enhanced bond portfolio vs. a linker benchmark 
 
The residual part of our investment is allocated in commodities and we will 
assume its performance is equal to that of the GSCI_TR total return index. We will 
define the benchmark against which we will test our strategy as a pure investment in 
linkers with a maturity matching that of the investment horizon. The return of the 
benchmark is therefore equal to the real rate defined at inception plus the accrued 
Portfolio Alt. Bench. Alt. Bench. Alt. Bench. Alt. Bench. Alt. Bench.
Average 5.18% 4.87% 5.51% 5.26% 5.98% 4.43% 6.59% 5.44% 7.18% 4.94%
Std. 2.20% 2.10% 4.31% 3.34% 5.89% 2.92% 7.72% 5.69% 11.24% 6.13%
IR
Average 3.66% 3.88% 4.05% 4.19% 4.60% 3.80% 5.04% 4.39% 5.64% 4.10%
Std. 1.77% 2.16% 2.98% 2.96% 4.81% 2.08% 8.60% 5.08% 13.00% 6.25%
IR
4Y 5Y
1990‐2010
Maturity 1Y 2Y 3Y
1.0590.6150.763‐0.180‐0.145
2000‐2010
0.140 0.291 1.394 1.307 1.769
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headline inflation over the life of the linker and floored at zero to respect TIPS 
characteristics. Real rates are defined as the difference between the US nominal zero 
coupon sovereign rate and the breakeven inflation of matching duration. The 
performance of the strategy compared to its benchmark is presented in Table 6 and 
the performances for two target maturities are represented as an illustration in Figure 
19. 
 
Figure 19: Out of sample evaluation of the strategic allocation vs. a benchmark portfolio. 
   
 For maturities above three years, our alternative strategy consistently beats its 
benchmark in terms of Information Ratio (IR) and mean absolute return for both time 
periods studied here, albeit with higher volatility. The strategy’s performance is 
increasing through time except at the four year horizon, though the difference with 
the three year is clearly not statistically significant. Contrary to our pass-through 
hypothesis, the strategy does perform better during the 1990-2010 period than in the 
2000-2010 period. It is probably explained by the severe counter-performance of 
nominal bonds contemporaneous with spiking inflation during the 2008-2009 US 
financial crisis as a result of flight to quality. The same is probably true for the one 
and two year horizon investment underperformance with respect to the benchmark in 
the 2000-2010 period as a result of severely depressed nominal rates. Real rates even 
went negative at times during the height of the crisis. 
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maximization of the portfolio’s Sharpe ratio. The obvious pitfall of this methodology 
is that we clearly do not want to be running a “back-trading” exercise but rather 
capture only low frequency “fundamental” movements as opposed to high frequency 
market timing moves. To achieve this goal, we run the optimization using trading cost 
which penalizes too frequent “opportunistic market-timing trades” while favoring 
long time trend reallocations. Since those results would still be too volatile to capture 
the phenomena we target, we used both proportional trading cost and nonlinear 
trading costs (which evolve with the square of the trade size) following (Amihud & 
Mendelson, 1986) and (Vayanos, 1998). This adjunction enables to obtain a credible 
allocation in terms of asset turnover with a reasonably high trading cost of up to 5% 
of turned-over assets (which is still considerably higher than what current trading 
costs are on average). The smoothed (nonlinear) allocation curve obtained (light blue 
continuous line) is plotted along with the linear trading costs curve (dark blue dashed 
line) in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 20: Optimal ex-post commodity allocation using proportional and nonlinear frictions 
 
 
 Since our working hypothesis would suggest that the difference between the rate 
of the CI and HI inflation is related to the optimal commodity allocation, we built the 
following allocation indicator (WI) as follows: the WI equals the yearly average of 
the ratio of the difference of the HI and the CI (if positive and 0 otherwise) over the 
HI if positive (0 otherwise). We then take the min of WI and 1 and the max of the 
previous condition and 0. The result is presented in Figure 6 (continuous dark blue 
line). 
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Comparing our optimal ex-post commodity allocation with the WI indicators we 
built yields the following observations: the three clear episodes of high allocation or 
commodities in our simulated portfolio in the early seventies, late seventies and 
eighties ended contemporaneously with a peaking followed by a sharp decrease of our 
indicator. It is slightly less clear but still apparent for the three latter episodes of 
higher commodity allocation in the 1990-2002 period. It then becomes completely 
uncorrelated in the 2002-2010 period during which our indicators becomes much 
more volatile and thus becomes less useful from an allocation point of view as its 
exploitable signal seems drowned with noise. These observations are consistent with 
our tactical allocation hypothesis which stated that the indicator should be more 
efficient at times when the pass-through does operate. Since the econometric 
literature we previously exposed dates this cessation to the early nineties, it is 
therefore logical that the WI should be good at timing commodities downturns before 
that and less so afterwards.  
 
Figure 21: Optimal ex-post GSCI_TR allocation using nonlinear frictions 
 
  
The second logical step to test the efficiency of our proposed indicator would be 
to conduct an out of sample ex-ante exploitation of it. To do so, we construct a 
quarterly rebalanced portfolio with a 40% commodities and 60% cash strategic 
allocation. 
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Figure 22: Out-of-sample quarterly rebalanced tactical GSCI allocation using the CH indicator 
 
 
 We then deviate tactically from this strategic allocation according to the WI 
indicator input: if the indicator goes up, we increase the allocation by 25%. If it goes 
down, we reduce it by half and if the indicator is at zero, we go back to the 40% 
strategic allocation. The resulting tactical allocation is plotted in Figure 7 (light blue 
continuous line). We benchmark it against the 40%-60% commodities-cash allocation 
(gray dotted line). Since on average our tactical allocation is 60%-40% commodities-
cash allocated, we also benchmark it on this alternative allocation (dark blue dashed 
line) to control for the extra commodity weight given in our tactical allocation. The 
results from these simulated portfolios are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 7: Quarterly rebalanced out-of-sample tactical evaluation vs. constant weight benchmark 
portfolio 
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Table 2: CI vs. HI risk reduction 
 
 
 As we mentioned earlier on, the drive to move liability indexation towards core 
inflation is currently curtailed by the lack of investable core-linked assets and 
therefore a lack of a market reference to enable marking-to-market of such Liability 
Driven Investments (LDIs). The strong potential demand for such securities drove 
Deutsche Bank to launch the first investable core proxy in September 2012 (Li & 
Zeng, 2012) in the form of a long-short linkers-energy commodities index which 
serves as a reference for trading fixed-for-float “core-proxy” inflation swaps. It is 
thus most probable that we will see CI-linked securities issued in the near future if 
the derivative market for core inflation takes off, as it did for HI-linked securities 
decades before. The relative cheapness of issuing CI linked securities could in 
particular attract cash-strapped sovereign issuers eager to attract new investors and 
reduce their financing cost volatility arising from the HI-link. 
To compensate for the lack of an investable CI security, investors wishing to 
hedge core inflation could either invest in a nominal bond portfolio and buy a fixed-
for-float core swap overlay as in (Li & Zeng, 2012) or invest in a linkers portfolio 
and swap the HI for CI as in (Fulli-Lemaire & Palidda, Swapping Headline for Core 
Inflation: An Asset Liability Management Approach, 2012). Using our correlation 
analysis findings, we could hope to arbitrage those derivatives by building a 
replicating commodity portfolio. It is a complex problem as pricing such an 
instrument would require a mark-to-model approach to price the CI leg using an 
incomplete market cross-hedging framework. 
 
Mean Std. HI CI
1970‐2010 0.02% 2.15% 3.40% 2.75% ‐19.15%
1970‐1990 0.01% 1.86% 3.22% 2.78% ‐13.49%
1990‐2010 0.03% 2.39% 2.91% 1.70% ‐41.82%
2000‐2010 0.10% 3.15% 3.79% 1.58% ‐58.25%
Timeframe
Δ(HI,CI) Volatility Volatility 
Reduction 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 The dramatic macroeconomic shift we have witnessed over the last decade has 
gradually reshaped our understanding of the relationship between macroeconomic 
variables and changes in commodity prices. The academic community has in 
particular delved into the disappearing pass-through of commodity price shocks into 
core inflation, and the far reaching consequences it has in terms of monetary policy 
conduct, especially so when it comes to dealing with surging crude oil prices and 
headline inflation. While macroeconomists and econometricians unraveled the 
breakdown in the pass-through, little concern was given about its consequences in 
terms of the allocation of commodities into inflation hedging portfolio management. 
This article endeavored to provide a first tentative answer to this question. The main 
take away from this paper can be summed-up in three arguments:  
Firstly, we have established that in terms of asset pricing and as a consequence of 
the disappearance of the pass-through, relative variations in the core inflation index 
to the headline inflation index have been strongly cointegrated with financial 
commodity prices since the early 2000s. It opens the way for a natural commodity 
allocation in a core driven global macro strategy. 
Secondly, we have shown in a back testing simulation exercise that as a 
consequence of the strong correlation between commodities and the spread between 
headline and core inflation, we can use forecasted core inflation data to determine an 
efficient strategic commodity allocation for an inflation hedged portfolio. 
Thirdly, we concluded that since core inflation is on average only marginally 
different from headline inflation for medium to long term investors, but experienced 
significantly lower inflation in the last decade, we probably will experience in the 
near future the development of a core linked securities market. All the more so since 
the issuance of the first core-proxy linked derivative this year. This would pave the 
way for an arbitrage strategy involving core versus headline inflation swaps and a 
cross-replicating commodity portfolio. 
 The principal issues this paper has either failed to resolve or ignored are the 
following: 
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Firstly, we have showed that timing the pass-through cycle does not seem to yield 
an efficient tactical commodity allocation in the current macroeconomic environment. 
By comparison, we were able to test that in the past, with an effective pass-through 
operating, the indicator we constructed displayed an ability to correctly generate a 
significant alpha by efficiently driving the commodity allocation to match the 
dynamic of commodities with respect to inflation. 
Secondly and lastly, we must mention that as a caveat to this study, the various 
backtesting exercises we ran were significantly positively impacted by what is 
probably an exceptional coincidence of secularly decreasing inflation and inflation 
risk premium with a historic bull run for commodities. One might wonder if the 
“brave new world” we were ushered into thanks to unconventional monetary policies, 
rapidly growing emerging countries and peak-oil will long leave the macroeconomic 
status quo untouched with a muted pass-through. 
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Chapter 3, Swapping Headline for Core Inflation:  
An Asset Liability Management Approach   
1. INTRODUCTION 
Whether inflation indexation should be performed based on core rather than 
headline inflation benchmarks or on CPI rather than RPI indices has been a core 
concern for central banks and pension funds, academics and practitioners alike. To 
this day, most inflation-targeting central banks around the world display headline 
inflation targets to anchor expectations, and some have even switched from core to 
headline targeting in the last decade or so in order to have targets that are directly 
understandable by politicians, financial markets practitioners and the general public: 
South Korea switched to headline targets in 2007 (Bank of Korea, 2006) and Thailand 
might follow suit (McCauley, 2007), leaving South Africa’s and Norway’s central 
banks as the only two displaying explicit core targets out the 23 of them using 
inflation-targeting. Still, academics used to present core inflation as the most efficient 
monetary policy target as in (Mishkin & Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007) or (Wynne, 1999). 
More recent works like (Gregorio, 2012) or (Walsh, 2011) tend to challenge that 
assumption in light of recent events where food inflation displayed persistency, 
especially in less advanced countries. But in spite of this tide of evidence pointing 
towards headline inflation indexation, we defend in this paper the idea that the time 
may have come to rethink our long-term inflation hedging strategies and move 
towards a core indexation of long-term inflation liabilities to the greater benefit of 
those seeking protection from monetary erosion. 
Econometric studies in all major economies (van den Noord et André 2007), and 
for the US in particular (Clark et Terry 2010) have evidenced that while headline 
inflation has been increasingly affected by exogenous commodity price shocks since 
the late eighties, their pass-through into core prices has dramatically reduced to 
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become statistically nil after the mid-nineties. It thus creates a drive to allocate 
commodities in inflation hedging portfolios as they naturally hedge the spread 
between the stable core and the volatile headline indices (Fulli-Lemaire, Allocating 
Commodities in Inflation Hedging Portfolios: A Core Driven Global Macro Strategy 
2012). But investing in commodities is still a complex and risky adventure for which 
not all types of investors have the adequate mandate or appetite to engage themselves 
into it. Yet, headline inflation has been shown to be mean reverting to its core peer in 
the medium term (Gelos & Ustyugova, 2012), and since the pass-through differential 
previously exposed results in a lower relative volatility of core inflation indices as 
compared to headline ones, we argue in this paper for a risk reduction in asset-
liability-management strategy in the form of a shift from headline to core inflation 
indexation of long-term inflation liabilities commonly found in pension funds and 
liability driven asset managers. The rationale of this move being that the commodity-
shock driven volatility effect of headline inflation spikes is averaged out over time, 
making long-term hedgers indifferent between both inflation liability targets while 
achieving a theoretically much less costly hedge because of the lower volatility of a 
core inflation benchmark. The obvious caveat of this alternative strategy is that no 
such outrightly core-inflation-indexed security exists today: there are no core yielding 
assets that could match consumer-price-indexed linked bonds in enabling investors to 
obtain headline inflation linked cash-flows. Though it is worth mentioning that 
Deutsche Bank recently introduced an investable core-proxy index (Li et Zeng 2012) 
that could well be the frontrunner of a primary core-linked security market. 
In the meantime, to make up for the lack of a core-linked asset, we propose to 
overlay the traditional liability management investment portfolio with a swap to 
transfer the difference between the headline and the core inflation in return for a fixed 
rate that would be paid to long-term investors by short-term hedgers which cannot 
benefit from such long duration averaging processes. That is why short-term investors 
cannot be at risk on the volatile part of the inflation index but can be at risk on the 
core inflation which is extremely sluggish over short horizons and variations of which 
are, to a large extent, capped by those of the nominal rates: we therefore argue for a 
nominal investment strategy coupled with the receiving end of the inflation spread 
from the swap for short-term investors, and a linker investment coupled with the 
other end of the swap transaction for long-term investors, which would obviously 
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have to roll their positions to match the maximum investment horizon of their short-
term counterparties. The market for such a swap will most likely be unbalanced as 
short-term investor demand might be inferior to long-term players’ offers. This would 
accordingly render the fair value of the swap priced under an efficient market 
hypothesis on synthetic forwards potentially inadequate as market-makers in the form 
of investment banks’ trading desks might be necessary to support the market. 
If such were the case, since this derivative is unarbitrable as it cannot be hedged 
on any market underlier because of the core inflation exposure, we would propose a 
cross-hedging strategy on commodities as the difference between core and headline 
inflation is highly correlated to them (Fulli-Lemaire, 2012), and has been increasingly 
so in the last twenty years. The pricing of the security would therefore be made on a 
cross-hedging cost basis under an incomplete market framework. The cross-hedging 
dimension will not be touched in this paper as we will remain under the efficient 
market hypothesis which includes the assumption that the security is outrightly 
arbitrable. We shall deviate slightly from this framework in the last section to 
introduce the optional setting which could constitute the basis for the cross-hedging 
strategy, but only in order to enhance the swap pricing by introducing the risk 
asymmetry between fixed and floating swap spread investors which justifies the 
existence of the risk premium that long-term investors are precisely trying to capture. 
The core versus headline swap would thus yield both an intermediated commodity 
investment for inflation protection buyers which cannot do so directly, and would 
also permit the construction of a market curve for core inflation as linkers enabled the 
construction of a headline one a decade ago in the US, which would potentially ease 
the way for core-linked securities issuances. 
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trends without the noise added by short-term effects captured by the headline 
inflation measure. Moreover, core inflation was assumed to be driven by the 
performance of headline inflation with a lag during which the inflation pass-through 
operated by gradually closing the gap between the two indicators. As an illustration 
of this phenomenon, Figure 1 presents the trend in the US core and headline inflation 
indices’ year-on-year returns over half a century and the oil shocks of the seventies 
can clearly be seen as the ideal case study of this phenomenon: we have an initial 
shock in commodity markets, immediately followed by a steep rise in headline 
inflation which in turn drives core inflation upward until it closes the gap in a little 
over two years. The Headline-minus-Core (HmC) spread then turns briefly negative 
and the cycle goes on, with the mean reverting to around zero. Throughout the first 
forty years of the period studied, albeit for a very brief moment during the oil shocks 
of the seventies, this spread remained marginal compared to the overall level of both 
inflation indices. This theory thus seemed to hold fairly well until the turn of the 
century, at which point it could no longer explain the subsequent sequence of events: 
Figure 24 zooms-in on those last ten years or so on which we will focus in this paper. 
 
Figure 24: Core vs. Headline Inflation in the US over the last decade 
 
 
During this period, inflation levels remained historically low following the end of 
the “Great Moderation” era (Stock & Watson, 2003): core inflation in particular 
‐6%
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remained very stable around 2% per annum whilst headline inflation, which had 
hovered around 2.4% p.a. in the decade before the crisis, started to become more 
volatile as it rose then fell at the turn of the decade. But throughout this period, core 
inflation seemed unmoved by event seemingly driving the headline inflation. 
Moreover, the spread between the two indices rose to a significant fraction of the core 
level for a sustained period of time, which in itself was historically unheard of: the 
pass-through had clearly ceased to operate in the way it used to. Econometrists used 
to believe that exogenous oil price shocks were the main drivers of macroeconomic 
variables’ volatility as in (Hamilton, 1983). Yet, as (Hooker, 1999) noted, this 
straightforward causal relationship ceased to be unequivocally statistically significant 
in the mid-eighties as a major paradigm shift ongoing at the time profoundly altered 
the nature of the links between those exogenous commodity price shocks and both 
inflation measures by differentiating their responses to them: macroeconomic 
variables such as output or core inflation were less responsive whilst headline 
inflation became increasingly impacted by them. This diminishing overall impact of 
exogenous oil price shocks since the mid-eighties was extensively studied by 
macroeconomist following the seminal article of (Blanchard & Gali, 2007) which 
provided some explanations to what might be the causes of this reduction which they 
attributed to better monetary policies, reduced energy intensiveness and nominal 
wage rigidity relaxation. The consequences of which were indeed measured by (van 
den Noord & André, 2007) and (Clark et Terry 2010) in the following manner: since 
approximately the mid-eighties, the pass-through of exogenous oil price shocks into 
headline inflation was increasing while the pass-through into core inflation had most 
probably ceased to operate in the mid-nineties. 
As emerging economies steadily increased their commodity consumption 
throughout the latter part of the twentieth century, the growth of which vastly 
outmatched the rise in production required to contain prices, we witnessed a dramatic 
increase in their overall prices, in particular on energy and agricultural commodities. 
It thereby fuelled a more than a decade long commodity bull-run of historic 
proportions which started in the mid-nineties and is still fairly active today but for a 
short break due to the US subprime crises and the ensuing “Great Recession” 
(Farmer, 2011) which had dented consumption and depressed prices for a short while 
before they resumed their steady rise. Combined with an increasingly powerful pass-
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headline indexation and will therefore be on the receiving end of the more volatile 
headline inflation leg. Since there is a maturity mismatch between those two investor 
classes, deals will either have to be intermediated by a bank which will perform the 
inter-temporal intermediation, or more simply, its duration will be constrained by the 
short investor horizon. Long-term investors will have to roll their short-term positions 
as it is customary in ALM for many other fixed-income investment issues. The rest of 
the paper will focus on this second possibility. 
Let FR represent a fixed rate settled at inception such that the Mark-To-Market 
(MtM) value of the swap be nil. The CHS can then be written as: 
ܥܪܵ ൌ 	ܵݓܽ݌ሺܪܫ	|	ܥܫ ൅ ܨܴሻ 
It can be rewritten in a Fixed-For-Float (FFF) format: 
ܥܪܵ ൌ 	ܵݓܽ݌ሺܪܫ െ 	ܥܫ	|	ܨܴሻ 
Long-term investors will therefore pay the HmC spread and receive a fixed rate 
while short-term investors will place themselves at the other end of the deal. In such a 
FFF format, it can easily be seen that from a risk perspective, the spread payers face a 
more risky deal (even through the spread can turn negative at times). For such a 
reason, there will obviously be a risk premium included in the determination of the 
fixed rate to the benefit of float payers. 
 Since we know that variations in the HmC spread should be strongly correlated 
with variations in investable commodity indices, this swap could be cross-hedged 
with a synthetic cross-replicating commodity portfolio. If such were the case, this 
instrument could be marketed by investment banks acting as intermediaries between 
institutional investors and commodity markets. It would therefore answer institutional 
investors’ risk-versus-benefit problem of a direct investment in commodities while 
providing them with an instrument to hedge the gap risk between the two inflation 
indices. Yet, pricing such an instrument is a true challenge in itself for two reasons: 
Firstly, both legs of the swap are settled through monthly fixing of the core and 
the headline inflation which results in significant pricing complexity arising from the 
time gap risk. There is little novelty in it as time-gaps are standard difficulty in fixed 
income asset pricing. What is relatively new in this case is that since there is no 
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marketable security linked to core inflation to this day as they are securities linked to 
the headline inflation such as Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS), we 
obviously neither can price the core leg of the swap in a direct mark-to-market 
approach nor hedge it on any underlier.  
Secondly, as we mentioned in the preceding point that there are no marketable 
securities linked to core inflation but that we do know that the net cash flows of the 
swap being the HmC spread and that it is probably highly correlated to commodity 
indices, we can envisage a cross-hedging of the swap on a cross-replicating 
commodity portfolio. Such a hedging strategy based on correlations would add an 
extra “decorrelation risk” that has to be borne by the sellers of the derivative and 
which should be measured as accurately as it possibly can be in order to price it. 
We will then proceed in three steps: Firstly, the instrument will be priced in a 
“Perfect Foresight Environment” (PFE) using realized values of the variables in 
order to perform a backward-looking simulation exercise to assess the viability of the 
strategy assuming there is no pricing issue. Secondly, placing ourselves in an 
“Efficient Market Hypothesis” (EMH), we will assume the core inflation index is 
investable and construct a synthetic future curve for it from which we will derive a 
no-arbitrage pricing of the security. Last but not least, we will introduce the optional 
framework required to perform the cross-hedging while abstaining from further 
developing the cross-replicating portfolio and the pricing it yields, as this would 
constitute another paper in itself. We shall nonetheless offer an alternative pricing to 
the previously exposed no-arbitrage one by adopting the (Korn & Kruse, 2004) 
formula which we hope will enhance the pricing of the swap by factoring in better the 
risk premium as it is an adaptation of the Black-Scholes (Black & Scholes, 1973) 
framework to price inflation derivatives. 
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We then define the benchmark strategies against which we will compare our 
alternative one as a pure investment in linkers for both short-term and long-term 
participants. In real terms, the cash flows for both portfolios are netted on a different 
benchmark: a core inflation one for LT and a headline inflation one for ST investors. 
We therefore have the following nominal and real returns for LT (LTR and CLT), ST 
(STR and RST), and real returns for the short (RRR) and long (CRR) benchmark: 
Nominal investor returns: 	൜ܮܴܶ	 ൌ 	ܴܴ ൅ ܥܫ ൅ ܴܵ																	ܴܵܶ	 ൌ 	ܴܰ	 ൅	ሺܪܫ െ ܥܫሻ	– ܴܵ	 
Real investor returns:										൜ܥܮܶ	 ൌ 	ܴܴ ൅ ܴܵ																																																																ܴܵܶ	 ൌ 	ܴܰ െ ܥܫ	– 	ܴܵ ൌ ܴܴ െ ܴܵ ൅ ሾܧሺܪܫሻ െ ܥܫ	ሿ 
Real benchmark returns:					ቄܥܴܴ	 ൌ 	ܴܴ ൅ ሾܪܫ െ ܥܫ	ሿܴܴܴ	 ൌ ܴܴ																										 
The results obtained from this backward-looking simulation of the portfolios 
derived from our strategy are presented in the Figure 26 below. We have the nominal 
and real returns for short-term participants (STRh and RSTh) and long-term ones 
(LTRh and CLTh) and the real returns on the ST and LT benchmark portfolios (RRRh 
and CRRh). 
 
Figure 26: PFE pricing, LT vs. ST and vs. Benchmark real performance for a 5-year horizon 
 
 
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Start Date
%
Long vs. Short 5Y Perfect Foresight Real Performance 
 
RSTh
CLTh
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Start Date
%
Comparative 5Y Perfect Foresight  Real Perf of H vs. C Benchmark 
 
 
CRRh
CLTh
Fulli-Lemaire Nicolas | Thèse de doctorat | Janvier 2013 
 
- 99 - 
As could have been expected, over the five-year investment horizon example 
presented in the previous figure, there is a clear performance spread between our LT 
and ST portfolios to the benefit of the latter. It is a logical reflection of the risk-return 
premium associated with a nominal investment. On the benchmarked comparison for 
the LT investor, there seems to be little interest in engaging in the alternative strategy 
as the benchmark performs better overall throughout the sample period even though 
the alternative strategy is purely deterministic with respect to its indexation while the 
benchmark is not. 
The same conclusion can be found again in the backward looking pricing exercise 
results presented in the Table 3: since there is no risk added in engaging in the swap 
in a perfect foresight environment (as it is entered at the precise value at which it will 
be settled) there is no clear incentive to sell the volatile fraction of the headline 
inflation as there is no added risk premium to be captured by LT investors. This 
becomes increasingly less so as the maturity of the deal increases for LT investors 
and there is even an added volatility compared to the benchmark strategy. It is 
obviously the opposite for the ST investors (albeit over very short investment 
horizon) and with also a larger volatility at any horizon considered here. 
 
Table 3: ILB + Swap vs. ILB for LT investors in the perfect foresight environment 
 
Horizon  1 Y   2Y  5Y   10Y 
ST Portfolio  RSTh  RRRh  RSTh  RRRh  RSTh  RRRh  RSTh  RRRh 
Mean  1.81%  1.85%  2.41%  2.18%  3.72%  2.55%  5.51%  3.38% 
Std.  2.24%  1.64%  2.09%  1.42%  1.68%  1.45%  1.17%  0.93% 
IR  ‐0.01  0.13  1.06  1.50 
Ex‐post max 
Real Premium  ‐0.04%  0.23%  1.17%  2.13% 
                          
LT Portfolio  CLTh  CRRh  CLTh  CRRh  CLTh  CRRh  CLTh  CRRh 
Mean  1.85%  2.07%  2.18%  2.40%  2.55%  2.83%  3.38%  3.71% 
Std.  1.64%  1.84%  1.42%  1.33%  1.45%  1.33%  0.93%  1.04% 
IR  ‐0.20  ‐0.32  ‐0.68  ‐1.13 
Ex‐post min 
Risk Premium  0.21%  0.22%  0.28%  0.33% 
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For this dataset, we compute outrightly the swap rate and use it to obtain the nominal 
and real returns on our LT (SLT and SLC) and ST (SST and SSR) portfolio with the 
same benchmarks as before. We present in (Figure 27) the results in the five-year 
horizon case. 
Again, we see a positive spread in favor of ST investors compared to LT ones as 
the nominal investment pays off. We also underperform our benchmark portfolio in 
the LT case. Since we placed ourselves in an EMF and we used expectations to 
compute the spread value, there is no reason to believe the risk premium was included 
in the computation and, in light of those arguments, the results seem all the more 
logical. The performance in (Table 2) presented hereunder reinforces this assumption: 
 
Table 4: ILB + Swap vs. ILB for LT investors in using simulated futures for pricing 
 
 
The results we found in this exercise are in accordance with the previous one: 
there is only a marginal increase in the performance of the LT strategy in terms of 
information ratios (corresponding to an increase in gross return coupled with a 
decrease in the volatility). Once again, the difference between the ex-post minimum 
and maximum risk premium upholds the belief that there is room to trade strictly 
above the two year horizon in this case. 
Horizon  1 Y   2Y  5Y   10Y 
ST Portfolio  SSR  RRR  SSR  RRR  SSR  RRR  SSR  RRR 
Mean  2.07%  2.07%  2.61%  2.41%  3.87%  2.83%  5.81%  3.72% 
Std.  1.94%  1.84%  1.86%  1.33%  1.80%  1.33%  1.05%  1.04% 
IR  0.00  0.16  0.90  1.54 
Ex‐post max 
Real Premium  0.00%  0.20%  1.04%  2.09% 
                          
LT Portfolio  SLC  CRR  SLC  CRR  SLC  CRR  SLC  CRR 
Mean  1.60%  2.07%  1.99%  2.41%  2.38%  2.83%  3.00%  3.72% 
Std.  2.10%  1.84%  1.85%  1.33%  1.58%  1.33%  1.15%  1.04% 
IR  ‐0.19  ‐0.26  ‐0.48  ‐1.11 
Ex‐post min 
Risk Premium  0.47%  0.42%  0.45%  0.72% 
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replicating hedging portfolios. The following option-derived (Mark-to-Model) pricing 
framework deviates from the EMH as it breaks the Absence of Arbitrage Opportunity 
(AAO) assumption. Its aim is to better apprehend the risk asymmetry which 
underscores the risk premium which we are trying to price. But without the cross-
correlation element, we will still fall short of the investable asset requirement 
identified above. 
Without losing generality, we will restrict ourselves to the pricing of a Zero 
Coupon Swap (ZCS) as any other type of couponed swap can be decomposed as a 
sum of ZCS. The CHS premium can therefore be written as: 
ݏ஼ுௌ௧,் ൌ ܰ ∙ ॱ௧ ቀ൫ߨ଴,்ு െ ߨ଴,்஼ െ ܴܵ଴,்൯݁ିఛ∙ሺ்ି௧ሻቁ 
 At inception, we want to set the swap Rate (ܴܵ) such that the swap premium is 
nil. Let	ܴܵ଴,் be such that: 
ݏ஼ுௌ் ൌ 0			 ⇒ 	ܴܵ଴,் 	ൌ 	ॱ଴൫ߨ଴,்ு െ ߨ଴,்஼ ൯ 
As before, we will use our simulated futures for both underlyings to make-up for 
the lack of an historic dataset. 
The natural way to price the swap would be to separate the discrete, low 
frequency gap-hedging problem from the cross hedging problem as is customary in 
fixed-income literature: we would, begin with, ignore the discrete fixing problem of 
inflation linked -securities as we assume the price is derived from Breakeven 
Inflation rates (BEI) equivalents which are traded in almost continuous time. We 
would then define a synthetic underlying of our swap to be		ܸ with		 ଴ܸ,்	 ൌ
൫ߨ଴,்ு െ ߨ଴,்஼ ൯ which would represent the volatile fraction of inflation. Yet, such an 
underlying would obviously not be an investable asset even though (Fulli-Lemaire, 
Allocating Commodities in Inflation Hedging Portfolios: A Core Driven Global 
Macro Strategy 2012) deduced that it could be cross-hedged fairly well on 
commodities futures. 
 In order to simulate the hedging of the swap, we would like to be able to 
compute sensitivities to investable securities or to a synthetic one that can be cross-
hedged. Since the current stochastic literature has been constructed for the pricing of 
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Since we have by cap-floor parity: 
ቐ
ܵݓܽ݌ሺܪ|ܨܴுሻ 	ൌ ܨ݈݋݋ݎሺܪ|ܨܴுሻ െ ܥܽ݌ሺܪ|ܨܴுሻ								
ܵݓܽ݌ሺܥ|ܨܴ஼ሻ 		ൌ ܨ݈݋݋ݎሺܥ|ܨܴ஼ሻ െ ܥܽ݌ሺܥ|ܨܴ஼ሻ											
ܵݓܽ݌ሺܪ|ܥ ൅ ܴܵሻ ൌ ܵݓܽ݌ሺܪ|ܨܴுሻ െ ܵݓܽ݌ሺܥ|ܨܴ஼ሻ	
	 
⇒ ܵݓܽ݌ሺܪ|ܥ ൅ ܴܵሻ ൌ 	ܨ݈݋݋ݎሺܪ|ܨܴுሻ െ ܥܽ݌ሺܪ|ܨܴுሻ െ ܨ݈݋݋ݎሺܥ|ܨܴ஼ሻ ൅ ܥܽ݌ሺܥ|ܨܴ஼ሻ 
By placing ourselves as the receiver of the inflation spread and wishing to hedge 
its trade, we are therefore short of the swap. Since option prices are by definition 
non-negative, we only wish to hedge: 
ܪ݁݀݃݁ ൌ െܨ݈݋݋ݎሺܪ|ܨܴுሻ െ ܥܽ݌ሺܥ|ܨܴ஼ሻ 
Using the modified Black-Scholes formula of (Korn & Kruse, 2004), we derive 
the option prices for both options assuming the Core and Headline inflation indices 
respect the following geometric Brownian motion: 
൜݀ܪሺݐሻ ൌ ሺ߬ே െ ߬ோሻ ∙ ܪሺݐሻ ∙ ݀ݐ ൅ ߪு ∙ ܪሺݐሻ ∙ ݀ ுܹሺݐሻ݀ܥሺݐሻ ൌ ሺ߬ே஼ െ ߬ோሻ ∙ ܥሺݐሻ ∙ ݀ݐ ൅ ߪ஼ ∙ ܪሺݐሻ ∙ ݀ ஼ܹሺݐሻ 
Where ߬ே஼is constructed such that: 
߬ே஼ ൌ ߨ஼ ൅ ߬ோ 
We can therefore create the replicating portfolios for both options by computing 
the deltas of both options: 
∆ܪ ൌ	ߜு		ܽ݊݀	∆ܥ ൌ 	ߜ஼	 
Since C is not an investable asset, we compute the investment in	ܸ ൌ ܪ െ ܥ: 
൝
∆ܪ ൌ 	ߜு											
∆ܥ ൌ 	ߜ஼												
∆ܸ ൌ ∆ሺܪ െ ܥሻ
		⇒ 			 ൝
∆ܸ ൌ 	ߜ஼																					
∆ܪ ൌ 	ߜு	– ߜ஼	
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Figure 29: BS pricing, LT vs. ST and vs. Benchmark real performance for a 5 year horizon 
 The option derived pricing seems in effect to be much better at factoring in the 
risk premium as our LT alternative strategy is above its benchmark except for the 10 
year case for which the IR is very slightly negative. The ten year case negative result 
should be taken with precaution since our sample size makes this last caveat probably 
not that strong: a much longer sample or a simulation exercise would be needed to 
attain the necessary length in order to have significantly robust statistical result.  
 
Table 5: BS results 
 
 
The ST performance seems to suffer slightly for very short durations (under two 
years) but still outperforms its benchmark above that horizon. Overall, we once again 
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Horizon  1 Y   2Y  5Y   10Y 
ST Portfolio  RST  RRR  RST  RRR  RST  RRR  RST  RRR 
Mean  1.59%  2.07%  2.10%  2.41%  3.26%  2.83%  5.26%  3.72% 
Std.  2.13%  1.84%  2.15%  1.33%  2.02%  1.33%  1.27%  1.04% 
IR  ‐0.251  ‐0.187  0.329  1.134 
Ex‐post max 
Real Premium  ‐0.47%  ‐0.31%  0.43%  1.54% 
                          
LT Portfolio  CLT  CRR  CLT  CRR  CLT  CRR  CLT  CRR 
Mean  2.07%  2.07%  2.49%  2.41%  3.00%  2.83%  3.66%  3.72% 
Std.  2.05%  1.84%  1.71%  1.33%  1.49%  1.33%  1.00%  1.04% 
IR  0.003  0.059  0.162  ‐0.069 
Ex‐post min 
Risk Premium  ‐0.01%  ‐0.09%  ‐0.16%  0.06% 
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have a strong case for our strategy over medium horizons and less good over very 
short horizons if we consider the ex-post min-max risk-premium range.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 Inflation hedging for long-term investors has remained an elusive problem 
despite the introduction of inflation linked securities in the bond market in the early 
eighties, followed by indexed swaps in the derivative market at the turn of the 
millennia. Even if these novel asset classes have become mainstream tools for 
institutional investors like insurance companies and pension funds, long-term 
investors have been left grappling with diminishing real returns and insufficient 
liquidity to match their liabilities. Forays into alternative hedging strategies involving 
exotic asset classes and complex products has long been held for good reasons as a 
receipt for disaster as institutional investors never truly should have a mandate to 
invest in hedging strategies too far from their liabilities. And indeed, as the perfect 
financial storm hit at the end of the decade, many were probably left wondering why 
they ever had attempted such an endeavor, even if the dismal performance of linkers 
could have provided a comfort of some sort, though obviously not to their claimants. 
Considering the previously exposed econometric arguments, and the sobering 
counter-performance of linkers and alternatives alike in the last decade, this paper 
proposes a new kind of approach to long-term inflation hedging in the form of a 
differentiation of benchmark between long and short-term investors. In light of the 
results presented, our novel strategy consisting of an investment in nominal assets for 
short duration and buying the volatile fraction of the inflation index makes sense for 
short-term investors while investing in linkers and selling the spread for long-term 
hedgers turn out to be a clear enhancement of the pure linker strategy which is 
currently the benchmark of the industry. 
Again, as we clearly laid out in the paper, the market for such a derivative might 
not be in equilibrium and would require an intermediation in the form of market 
makers. These traders would need an investable underlier for the swap to hedge their 
residual position. As the core inflation index is currently not investable but the swap 
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spread used in the security has been shown to be strongly correlated to commodities, 
a cross-correlation approach might be relevant and offers interesting opportunities for 
traders who would deal the core-headline swap presented here. Exploring this novel 
trading strategy would be an interesting natural extension of this paper.
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General Conclusion 
When the initial tremors of the impending housing crash struck financial markets 
in the summer of 2007, the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression era had 
claimed its first victims in the form of the demise of American quantitative equity 
market-neutral hedge funds (Khandani & Lo, 2007). Over the following year, real 
estate prices plunged and subprime mortgage holders massively defaulted on their 
loans, which in turn prompted the default of the structured investment vehicles 
owning them and thereby sealing the fate of the banks holding on to those securities. 
As the inescapable sequence of events unfolded, it was increasingly clear that one of 
the longest bull runs in recent history had abruptly come to an end. By the time equity 
markets had gone from peak to trough in mid-2009, hundreds of FDIC insured banks 
had failed in the US and all but two of the US investment banks were left standing, 
while much of the rest of the financial sector was under one form of government 
support or another in the US and throughout much of the world. Financial 
practitioners and academics were left contemplating the remains of decades of 
reckless financial innovation, daring leverage, regulatory arbitrage and blistering 
growth which had come momentously crashing down in September 2008. The demise 
of Lehman Brothers virtually froze the vital interbank financial market and obliged 
central banks and governments to provide support to an already severely battered 
financial system. Clearly, “This Time was Different” (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009): as 
the banking paradigm shifted from “too big to fail” to “too interconnected to fail” 
(Espinosa-Vega, 2009), central banks came back to center stage as “lenders of last 
resort” by injecting trillions in emergency liquidity funding. Those game changing 
events compelled regulators and legislators to rewrite the rulebook of financial 
regulation, which became known as the Dodd–Frank Act (Congress of the United 
States of America, 2010), the Vickers report (Chow & Surti, 2011), the Basel III 
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framework (BIS, 2011) and Solvency II (European Comission, 2009) to name but a 
few. Their implementation will have profound effects on the way financial 
institutions will operate and manage their businesses in the future, even though their 
sheer complexity might prove a hindrance to their effectiveness at stemming global 
systemic crises of the like we saw in the late-2000s as their most famous critic 
explains (Haldane, 2012). Striking the right balance will be an arduous task: “The 
main challenge, here, is to find the right trade-off between a sophisticated system, 
fine-tuned to each marginal change in systemic risk, and an approach based on 
simple-to-communicate triggers and easy-to-implement rules” as (Blanchard, 
Dell’Ariccia, & Mauro, Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy, 2010) state. But most 
disturbingly, while macroprudential stability became the chief concern of central 
banks throughout the crises and was clearly the sole motive of their massive market 
interventions during them, central bankers did not have their mandate explicitly 
redefined in light of their new found legitimacy as the last stand of macroprudential 
stability in rough seas (Borio, 2011). Rewriting the central bankers’ rulebook is 
clearly of the essence and it is therefore imperative to rethink the instruments central 
banks will be entitled to use for efficiently achieving this (Goodhart, 2008). Failing to 
do so would inevitably damage the credibility they painfully acquired in recent 
decades, the consequences of which would be hard to measure, in particular when it 
comes to anchoring future inflation expectations. 
As the “perfect financial storm” (Blanchard, The Perfect Storm, 2009) receded, its 
aftermath revealed a profoundly changed macroeconomic landscape to which 
investors have yet to adapt (Orr, 2012). If the “Great Moderation” era (Stock & 
Watson, 2003) of the twenty years or so before the onset of the crisis had been 
characterized by a major reduction in the volatility of macroeconomic variables, in 
particular by low and stable inflation, the crisis period was clearly of a very different 
nature as headline inflation volatility surged to levels which had been unseen in 
decades. This massive spike in volatility was initially driven by the record 
commodity bull run which ended shortly before the “Great Recession” (Farmer 2011) 
gripped many economies, which in turn contracted demand for most commodities, 
thus further increasing volatility levels as prices went down. Compared to the 
previously calm waters investors had navigated in the previous decade, basically 
every investment class took a severe hit from the bursting of the housing bubble in 
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the US: as investments in equities, REITs, corporate bonds and obviously 
commodities went down in flames, the clear winners that escaped unscathed from the 
investors’ bloodbath were the true safe-haven asset classes composed of precious 
metals and high quality sovereign debt securities. The “stagflation” macroeconomic 
context of the few years following the crisis was somewhat reminiscent of the 1970s 
era in terms of real price levels, but was significantly different as the commodity 
price hike was demand driven and not supply constrained as in the oil embargo of the 
“Great Inflation” era (Blanchard & Riggi, 2009). The hallmarks of the post-crisis 
macroeconomic environment are to be found in the negative long-term sovereign real 
rates of most advanced economies. This is the result of the joint effect of the flight to 
quality affecting sovereign bonds, on which yields have fallen as investors flock to 
auctions on the one hand and inflationary pressures, which have not been 
satisfactorily tamed on the other hand. Worryingly, this macroeconomic context also 
shows some similarities with the post-Asian-crisis Japan of the late nineties even 
though the restructuring of the financial sector, at least in the US, has been swift and 
profound whereas “zombie lending” banks had plagued the Japanese economy for at 
least a decade after the crisis (Caballero, Hoshi, & Kashyap, 2008). But with any sign 
of recovery still far away on the horizon for many economies, the era of negative long 
real rates looks increasingly likely to last, along with the depressed output gap and 
the severe unemployment comparable for some countries to those suffered during the 
“Great Depression” of the 1930s. Commodity spot prices have also remained 
stubbornly high, further adding pressure on the shoulders of monetary-policy makers 
as they scale-up quantitative easing, while remaining unsure of its long-term effects 
on inflation and inflation expectations. 
Looking "through a glass, darkly" would be fitting to describe analyzing the 
expected future macro-financial environment as it has become particularly difficult 
nowadays considering how much the prevalent status quo has been challenged by the 
policy decisions and the events in the past few years since the onset of the crisis. This 
imperative necessity to revise commonly accepted policies in light of the recent crisis 
could not have been made clearer than in the IMF chief economist Olivier 
Blanchard’s landmark white paper on the current state of the macroeconomic 
environment (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, & Mauro, Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy, 
2010). In this paper, he begs the question whether we should increase our inflation 
  
- 114 - 
target in light of the crisis: “The crisis has shown that large adverse shocks can and 
do happen. In this crisis, they came from the financial sector, but they could come 
from elsewhere in the future—the effects of a pandemic on tourism and trade or the 
effects of a major terrorist attack on a large economic center. Should policymakers 
therefore aim for a higher target inflation rate in normal times, in order to increase 
the room for monetary policy to react to such shocks? To be concrete, are the net 
costs of inflation much higher at, say, 4 percent than at 2 percent, the current target 
range? Is it more difficult to anchor expectations at 4 percent than at 2 percent?” 
Embarking on such a journey down the path of markedly higher inflation would 
certainly mean threading through unchartered waters, an endeavor which monetary 
policy authorities have not been shy of in the post-crisis era, stretching the breadth of 
their mandate if not exceeding it altogether in the case of the ECB Outright Monetary 
Transaction mechanism for example. Whatever the outcome of this debate, market 
players will have to adapt their policies which had been tailored for the now long 
gone “Great Moderation” era. The risk managers of institutional investors are not 
exempt as the nature of both their assets and their liabilities have been profoundly 
altered by those events: the liabilities side of their balance sheet suddenly appeared 
more dangerous as the inflation risk surged while the assets side dwindled as a result 
of dismal market performances and dangerously low real rates. Those joint forces 
jeopardize their long-term stability and thereby threaten their very existence. This 
year witnessed pension funds in the UK going under as they were in a stranglehold 
over the asset-liability gap. It is then high time we rethink inflation hedging before 
we find ourselves “stuck between a rock and a hard place” and this paper provides 
three possible alternative ways of doing this. 
The first alternative solution proposed here consists in adapting current structured 
solutions in the form of portfolio insurance to provide additional cover for inflation 
risk. This research was motivated by two macro-financial constraints currently 
affecting inflation hedging strategies: Firstly, the very low real rates that investments 
in inflation-linked bonds yield are a hindrance for many long-term institutional 
investors such as pension funds which must deliver significant real returns. This sheer 
weakness of real returns has pushed many players into unhedged nominal strategies, 
which leaves them severely exposed to inflation shocks, especially if they are long-
lasting as would be the case in monetary policy paradigm change as is hinted above. 
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The second constraint hindering effective large scale inflation hedging is the dearth 
of linkers: as sovereign treasuries battle with an increasingly acute debt overhang 
problem, monetary erosion increasingly appears as the only possible getaway. This 
has been especially true since current rock-bottom real rates render nominal issues 
cheaper than real ones, thus limiting the will of states to issue inflation-linked 
securities. A chronic short supply of linkers would negatively affect the liquidity of 
the secondary market for linkers, which would in turn make hedging strategies more 
costly to implement, and even more costly to adjust, thereby impeaching the 
realization of dynamically efficient strategies. The use of a nominal portfolio 
insurance solution with real floors as is exposed in (Fulli-Lemaire, A Dynamic 
Inflation Hedging Trading Strategy, 2012) offers a way of completely relaxing our 
dependency on linkers: combining the dynamic trading of the purely nominal asset 
side of our portfolio to match a marked-to-market liability modeled by the real floor 
inflated with breakeven-inflation rates, we are able to offer a guaranteed real floor to 
investors up to a certain threshold of real losses as in the conventional CPPI. Were 
the strategy to break the floor, we have the contingency option of liquidating our 
portfolio and buying zero-coupon inflation swaps, thus curtailing the downside risk. 
Deploying the DIHTS strategy in the current market environment would be difficult 
because of the negative real rates currently prevailing throughout most advanced 
economies, which are still in the investment grade club as a result of the flight to 
quality phenomenon currently gripping fixed-income markets. A make-up solution 
could be found in a partial relaxation of the dependency on linkers by devising a 
CPPI based on real bonds, thereby offering enhanced real returns with an inflation 
floor as in the iCPPI of (Graf, Haertel, Kling, & Ruß, 2012). This hybrid class of 
structured products would not be restricted by the level of real rates and would reduce 
the share of linkers as compared to the current fully hedged portfolio strategies. It 
would ideally complement the DIHTS when market conditions hinder its inception. 
The second alternative solution explored here aims at exploiting current advances 
in macroeconomics to allocate commodities in inflation hedged portfolios: since 
exogenous commodity price shocks feed into headline inflation, this asset class has 
been regularly branded as the “natural inflation hedge” (Z. Bodie 1983) since at least 
the late seventies. Yet, commodities as an asset class are significantly more volatile 
than inflation and their correlations with consumer price indices has been subject to 
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significant time variability, not to mention boom and bust phenomena as we fairly 
recently witnessed. Yet, it is nonetheless true that this asset class enables portfolio 
managers to achieve greater diversification (Conover M. C., Jensen, Johnson, & 
Mercer, 2010) as it is weakly correlated with either conventional or alternative asset 
classes (Chong & Miffre, 2010). But what is perhaps the most significant aspect of 
commodity investing for us lies in the fact that although they seem to offer interesting 
unexpected inflation-hedging potential for long-term investors (Attié and Roache, 
Inflation Hedging for Long-Term Investors 2009), even their hedging capabilities 
seem to wane beyond a certain horizon (Brière and Signori 2010), which seems 
puzzling. One of the possible classic solutions to enhance the hedging potential of 
commodities and which could solve this puzzle would be to move from a static VAR-
based strategic allocation to a dynamic one. This kind of dynamic tactical allocation 
has been central to modern asset management and has been extensively developed to 
allocate commodities in conventional portfolio allocation using momentum indicators 
to generate alphas for example. To the best of our knowledge, no global-macro 
commodity allocation trading strategy for inflation hedging portfolios has been 
proposed in the literature and it is precisely what we aimed to achieve here. The 
starting point of this research has been a relatively novel development in 
macroeconomics: until fairly recently, exogenous commodity price shocks were 
assumed to propagate homogeneously between headline and core price indices, albeit 
with a lag, as a result of the transmission mechanism to which we referred as the 
headline-to-core inflation pass-through (Hamilton, 1983). But roughly since the 
counter oil shock of the mid-eighties, this economic paradigm had to be revisited as 
exogenous oil price shock after this date did not seem to have such a profound impact 
on other macro-variables as it used to. The authoritative white paper of (Blanchard & 
Gali, 2007) estimated that as a result of a combination of better monetary policies, 
reduced energy intensity of output and relaxation of nominal wage rigidities, 
exogenous oil price shocks do not propagate nowadays in the economy as they did 
with significant consequences during the oil-shock driven high inflation period of the 
seventies. Yet, they also showed that although the macroeconomic consequences of 
oil shocks have declined, the impact on headline inflation of those shocks has actually 
increased. This finding is corroborated by our correlation study between headline 
inflation indices and commodity indices which exhibit a significant secular increase 
throughout the nineties and noughties. The defining moment for the definition of our 
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novel strategy came with the articles of (van den Noord and André 2007) and (Clark 
et Terry 2010), which estimated for a large set of countries that the pass-through of 
exogenous commodity price shocks into core inflation had been null and statistically 
significantly so since the mid-nineties. Indeed, our correlation analysis again 
corroborates these findings in two ways: firstly, the correlation with core inflation of 
commodity indices has remained exceptionally low in a period of high volatility and 
the spread between core and headline inflation has been strongly co-integrated with 
commodity indices since the early nineties whereas it was not so beforehand. The 
combination of those findings sets the stage for our strategy in the sense that it 
provides commodities with a natural allocation technique which can be determined 
exogenously: since we know that core inflation exhibits both low volatility and a 
weak correlation with commodities, we can allocate the latter to hedge the difference 
between the expected value for headline inflation and core inflation. The residual 
core inflation exposure can be either eliminated by swapping it at fixed rate (Li & 
Zeng, 2012) or by leaving it unhedged and investing in nominal-rate yielding assets 
such as bonds or cash securities. Our backtesting of this strategy has yielded 
significant strong alphas compared to a conventional linkers portfolio in a risk-
adjusted basis as the downside risk looks fairly limited. Additionally, we exposed in 
our paper (Fulli-Lemaire, Allocating Commodities in Inflation Hedging Portfolios: A 
Core Driven Global Macro Strategy, 2012) a tactical allocation strategy which aims at 
optimizing the commodity allocation depending on the pass-through cycle of headline 
inflation mean reverting to its core anchor through time. Backtesting of this strategy 
revealed that it did exhibit strong outperformance in the previously high headline-to-
core inflation pass-through environment, but failed to yield significantly strong 
alphas on a risk-adjusted basis in the current environment. 
The third and last alternative proposed here consists in drawing a wedge between 
inflation hedgers according to their targeted investment maturity in order to 
differentiate whether headline or core linked assets would be the optimal hedging 
security for them. In our previous paper (Fulli-Lemaire, Allocating Commodities in 
Inflation Hedging Portfolios: A Core Driven Global Macro Strategy, 2012), we 
exposed the pass-through literature which we used to allocate commodities in 
inflation hedging portfolios. In the following paper (Fulli-Lemaire & Palidda, 
Swapping Headline for Core Inflation: An Asset Liability Management Approach, 
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2012), we strive to go further, questioning the liability benchmark itself in light of the 
current macro and econometric literature. We have previously shown that core 
inflation now seems unaffected by exogenous commodity price shocks (Clark et 
Terry 2010) strongly driving headline inflation indices (Blanchard & Gali, The 
Macroeconomic Effects of Oil Shocks: Why are the 2000s So Different from the 
1970s?, 2007). Moreover, (Gelos & Ustyugova, 2012) have shown that for most 
advanced countries, headline inflation indices are mean reverting towards core 
inflation ones over relatively short horizons. Eventually, we have shown (Fulli-
Lemaire, Alternative Inflation Hedging Portfolio Strategies: Going Forward Under 
Immoderate Macroeconomics, 2012) that, since the mid-nineties, headline and core 
inflation have exhibited markedly different volatility patterns as the latter has 
remained stubbornly stable whereas the former has experienced an exceptional burst 
of volatility. Considering those findings together, it becomes absolutely clear that 
inflation protection buyers, such as pension funds or insurance companies, hedging 
long-term liabilities should definitely opt for a core based liability benchmark as they 
have a sufficiently long investment horizon to benefit from the mean-reverting 
process of the core versus headline inflation spread which smooths-out headline 
inflation’s short-term deviations from the core reference and exhibits an overall much 
weaker volatility level. Obviously, short-term hedgers like retail asset managers 
selling yearly marked-to-market inflation protected structured products cannot benefit 
from this time-averaging process and must anchor their liabilities to headline 
inflation, thus driving a wedge between long-term and short-term hedgers in respect 
of their targeted liability benchmarks. The obvious pitfall of our proposed strategy for 
long-term players is that, to this day, no outrightly core-linked asset exists even 
though an investable proxy of the US core inflation index has been launched by 
Deutsche-Bank (Li & Zeng, 2012). We have therefore explored whether a new kind 
of derivative could achieve a better asset allocation for both parties by synthetizing a 
truly core-linked asset: were long-term investors to acquire a portfolio of headline 
inflation-linked bonds, they could then swap the spreads between the headline and the 
core indices in return for a fixed rate. This would in turn generate a core plus real-
return yielding portfolio as if it were composed of purely core-linked assets. On the 
other side of the deal, short-term investors would receive the spread between both 
indices and pay the fixed rate while they would be fully invested in nominal 
securities. It would give them a portfolio that has an unhedged exposure to core 
Fulli-Lemaire Nicolas | Thèse de doctorat | Janvier 2013 
 
- 119 - 
inflation whilst they are being fully hedged against the spread between both inflation 
references. This strategy would be particularly interesting for them since core 
inflation has exhibited very sluggish behavior over short horizons, and is therefore an 
absolutely manageable risk, while they are fully hedged against the volatile fraction 
of inflation, which would obviously be a much harder exposure to bear unhedged. 
Long-term investors would have to roll over their swaps to achieve a continuous 
hedge as its maturity cannot exceed that of short-term players, which is standard 
practice in asset-liability management anyway. This dual strategy would be an 
effective make-up solution for the lack of outrightly core-linked assets for long-term 
investors and a way to enhance real returns of short-term investors at the same time. 
Incidentally, trading this swap would provide a market reference for a core-inflation 
linked securities primary market, the premise of which has been set by the inception 
of the investable US core inflation proxy, motivation for which feeds on the same 
reasoning as the one previously exposed. The pricing of the swap rate would be the 
true hurdle of our strategy since we have no market references for the core inflation 
underlier, even though the survey of professional forecasters provides a reliable 
quarterly expectation figure in the US. The fair value pricing based on those expected 
values would probably be insufficient since it would not include the risk premium 
long-term investors seek in return for bearing the risk of the floating leg of the swap 
(even though there are themselves hedged against it if they hold the matching linkers 
portfolio as we proposed). The article briefly exposes an alternative pricing of the 
swap rate in the form of a commodity cross-hedging valuation: since the underlier of 
the swap, namely the headline minus core spread, has been shown in (Fulli-Lemaire, 
Allocating Commodities in Inflation Hedging Portfolios: A Core Driven Global 
Macro Strategy, 2012) to be strongly correlated with commodities indices, we could 
price the cross-replicating commodity portfolio which would in turn yield a synthetic 
price for the security. In any case, were such core-linked markets to develop, we 
would probably have to rewrite the current asset-liability management practices to 
reflect this shift. We could in particular envisage shifting indexation of long-term 
liabilities such as pension contracts towards a core benchmark since a regime change 
would at worst bring core inflation back more closely in line with its headline 
counterpart as it was previously in the seventies. 
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As always, whether a new round of quantitative easing turned out to be one too 
many, or because the sovereign debt overhang problem suddenly became unbearable, 
or because the monetary policy paradigm changed or because of any other unforeseen 
game-changing event were to strike, investors having gone into both conventional or 
alternative inflation hedging strategies would be left hoping for the best and bracing 
for the worst as only time will tell which one was cleverest. But clearly, as the current 
macro-financial status quo is being severely challenged, waiting idly by unhedged 
would be quite a rash choice. 
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Figure 31: Efficient frontier estimation of the DIHTS vs. the benchmark portfolio. 
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Figure 32 : Estimation of the mean Alpha values of the DIHTS and its 90% confidence interval 
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Figure 33: Mean dynamic allocation of the DIHTS. 
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Table 8: Horizon sensitivity analysis of the DIHTS vs. the Benchmark Portfolio 
CW 
 
MV 
 
IR 
 
DIHTS PTF DIHTS PTF DIHTS PTF
60,27% 33,80% 5,46% 3,65%
(28,6%) (21,93%) (1,8%) (0,63%)
44,03% 28,96% 6,89% 4,79%
(18,0%) (11,57%) (1,8%) (0,87%)
34,23% 24,52% 8,65% 6,09%
(12,4%) (7,61%) (1,8%) (1,02%)
26,89% 20,27% 10,45% 7,47%
(8,2%) (6,50%) (1,8%) (0,97%)
21,56% 17,13% 12,24% 9,00%
(5,8%) (5,05%) (1,8%) (0,96%)
17,92% 14,80% 14,22% 10,83%
(4,2%) (3,63%) (2,2%) (1,32%)
Fail Rate IR ToR
0,00%
0,00% 0,00%
1,91%
1,18%
1,66%
12,44%
Horizon 
(Years)
5
6
7
8
9
10
0,00%
0,00%
0,00%
0,00%
0,00%
DIHTS PTF DIHTS PTF DIHTS PTF
53,80% 29,69% 6,09% 6,59%
(27,1%) (26,33%) (2,2%) (1,29%)
42,26% 26,17% 7,66% 8,53%
(21,5%) (15,03%) (2,5%) (1,64%)
34,10% 22,11% 9,62% 10,74%
(14,0%) (8,11%) (2,7%) (2,09%)
27,85% 18,47% 11,70% 13,11%
(10,5%) (6,20%) (2,6%) (2,35%)
22,37% 15,82% 13,70% 15,75%
(8,6%) (5,05%) (2,5%) (2,78%)
18,56% 13,72% 15,90% 18,99%
(6,5%) (3,86%) (2,9%) (3,86%)
Horizon 
(Years)
Fail Rate IR ToR
5 0,00% 13,47%
6 0,00% 8,84%
7 0,00% 0,00%
10 0,00% 0,00%
8 0,00% 1,27%
9 0,00% 0,00%
DIHTS PTF DIHTS PTF DIHTS PTF
59,48% 24,35% 7,17% 7,36%
(30,2%) (32,65%) (3,2%) (1,39%)
48,70% 22,55% 8,91% 9,30%
(26,2%) (20,50%) (3,5%) (1,75%)
38,41% 20,82% 10,29% 11,45%
(18,3%) (11,31%) (3,9%) (2,03%)
32,06% 18,42% 11,18% 13,57%
(13,6%) (10,61%) (3,9%) (2,03%)
29,30% 15,91% 12,08% 15,87%
(13,6%) (9,53%) (3,7%) (2,10%)
25,56% 13,89% 13,33% 18,55%
(12,4%) (7,95%) (3,5%) (2,36%)
10 0,00% 7,52%
8 0,00% 8,28%
9 0,00% 9,66%
6 0,00% 21,55%
7 0,00% 9,47%
Horizon 
(Years)
Fail Rate IR ToR
5 0,00% 20,73%
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Table 9: Horizon sensitivity analysis of the allocation for the DIHTS. 
CW 
 
 
MV 
 
 
IR 
 
Horizon 
(Years) ZCN SPX REIT GSCI
23,5% 24,9% 24,9% 24,9%
(22,2%) (14,3%) (10,2%) (7,9%)
19,0% 26,6% 26,6% 26,6%
(19,7%) (12,2%) (8,3%) (6,2%)
13,9% 28,3% 28,3% 28,3%
(16,4%) (9,2%) (5,5%) (3,4%)
9,9% 29,7% 29,7% 29,7%
(12,9%) (6,2%) (2,6%) (0,7%)
7,6% 30,5% 30,5% 30,5%
(9,8%) (3,6%) (0,3%) (1,5%)
5,7% 31,2% 31,2% 31,2%
(6,9%) (1,4%) (1,6%) (3,3%)
5
6
7
8
9
10
Horizon 
(Years) ZCN SPX REIT GSCI
28,1% 29,9% 5,3% 35,0%
(22,2%) (17,3%) (14,9%) (13,9%)
24,1% 31,7% 5,7% 37,2%
(19,7%) (15,9%) (13,9%) (13,3%)
19,3% 33,7% 6,1% 39,7%
(16,4%) (14,2%) (13,1%) (12,9%)
14,9% 35,5% 6,6% 41,9%
(12,9%) (13,1%) (12,8%) (13,1%)
12,3% 36,5% 6,9% 43,3%
(9,8%) (12,7%) (13,0%) (13,6%)
9,8% 37,6% 7,2% 44,6%
(6,9%) (12,8%) (13,6%) (14,3%)
5
6
7
8
9
10
Horizon 
(Years) ZCN SPX REIT GSCI
31,6% 32,2% 19,8% 14,7%
(22,2%) (16,5%) (12,9%) (10,9%)
29,0% 33,6% 20,3% 15,7%
(19,7%) (14,4%) (10,9%) (9,2%)
25,9% 35,2% 20,6% 17,2%
(16,4%) (11,5%) (8,3%) (7,3%)
22,7% 36,8% 21,2% 18,3%
(12,9%) (8,7%) (6,9%) (6,8%)
20,3% 38,0% 22,4% 18,3%
(9,8%) (6,9%) (7,1%) (7,8%)
17,8% 39,3% 23,8% 18,3%
(6,9%) (7,1%) (8,3%) (9,4%)
5
6
7
8
9
10
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Table 10: Parameter sensitivity analysis for the DIHTS.  
 
CW 
 
 
MV 
 
 
Mu        
Eta
FR 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 5,3% 6,0%
ToR 9,1% (1,8%) 13,1% (2,8%) 14,3% (2,1%) 12,2% (1,8%) 11,5% (1,5%)
IR 22,9% (4,0%) 20,4% (4,1%) 17,9% (4,1%) 17,2% (6,2%) 17,4% (6,1%)
FR 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 5,3% (0,0%) 6,0% (0,0%)
ToR 9,0% (1,8%) 13,1% (2,8%) 14,3% (2,1%) 12,2% (1,8%) 11,5% (1,5%)
IR 22,9% (4,1%) 20,4% (4,1%) 17,9% (4,2%) 17,2% (6,2%) 17,4% (6,1%)
FR 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 5,3% (0,0%) 6,0% (0,0%)
ToR 8,8% (1,8%) 12,9% (2,8%) 14,2% (2,2%) 12,2% (1,8%) 11,5% (1,5%)
IR 22,8% (4,1%) 20,5% (4,1%) 17,9% (4,2%) 17,2% (6,2%) 17,4% (6,1%)
FR 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 5,3% (0,0%) 6,0% (0,0%)
ToR 8,8% (1,8%) 12,8% (2,8%) 14,2% (2,2%) 12,2% (1,8%) 11,5% (1,5%)
IR 22,8% (4,1%) 20,5% (4,1%) 17,9% (4,2%) 17,2% (6,2%) 17,4% (6,1%)
FR 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 5,3% (0,0%) 6,0% (0,0%)
ToR 8,7% (1,8%) 12,7% (2,8%) 14,1% (2,2%) 12,2% (1,8%) 11,5% (1,5%)
IR 22,8% (4,1%) 20,5% (4,1%) 17,9% (4,2%) 17,2% (6,2%) 17,4% (6,1%)
FR 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 5,3% (0,0%) 6,0% (0,0%)
ToR 8,7% (1,8%) 12,5% (2,7%) 14,1% (2,2%) 12,1% (1,8%) 11,5% (1,5%)
IR 22,8% (4,1%) 20,5% (4,1%) 0,179 (4,2%) 0,172 (6,2%) 0,174 (6,1%)
0.5%
1%
1.5%
2%
2.5%
10% 30% 50% 70% 90%
0%
Mu        
Eta
FR 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 9,0% 11,3%
ToR 10,0% (2,3%) 14,3% (3,8%) 16,0% (2,8%) 13,7% (2,9%) 12,8% (3,5%)
IR 23,4% (5,1%) 21,2% (5,6%) 18,6% (6,5%) 17,4% (7,7%) 16,8% (7,7%)
FR 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 9,0% (0,0%) 11,3% (0,0%)
ToR 9,9% (2,3%) 14,2% (3,8%) 15,9% (2,8%) 13,7% (2,9%) 12,8% (3,5%)
IR 23,4% (5,1%) 21,2% (5,6%) 18,6% (6,5%) 17,5% (7,7%) 16,8% (7,7%)
FR 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 9,0% (0,0%) 11,3% (0,0%)
ToR 9,8% (2,3%) 14,0% (3,8%) 15,9% (2,9%) 13,7% (3,0%) 12,8% (3,5%)
IR 23,4% (5,1%) 21,2% (5,7%) 18,6% (6,5%) 17,4% (7,7%) 16,8% (7,7%)
FR 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 9,0% (0,0%) 11,3% (0,0%)
ToR 9,7% (2,2%) 13,9% (3,8%) 15,8% (2,9%) 13,7% (3,0%) 12,8% (3,5%)
IR 23,4% (5,1%) 21,2% (5,7%) 18,6% (6,5%) 17,4% (7,7%) 16,8% (7,7%)
FR 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 9,0% (0,0%) 11,3% (0,0%)
ToR 9,6% (2,3%) 13,7% (3,8%) 15,8% (3,0%) 13,7% (3,0%) 12,8% (3,5%)
IR 23,4% (5,2%) 21,2% (5,7%) 18,6% (6,5%) 17,5% (7,8%) 16,8% (7,7%)
FR 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 9,0% (0,0%) 11,3% (0,0%)
ToR 9,5% (2,3%) 13,6% (3,8%) 15,7% (3,0%) 13,7% (3,0%) 12,8% (3,5%)
IR 23,4% (5,1%) 21,2% (5,7%) 0,186 (6,5%) 0,175 (7,8%) 0,168 (7,7%)
0.5%
1%
1.5%
2%
2.5%
10% 30% 50% 70% 90%
0%
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IR 
 
  
Mu        
Eta
FR 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 25,6% 20,3%
ToR 9,6% (2,3%) 12,1% (2,4%) 13,5% (3,6%) 11,3% (2,8%) 11,1% (2,0%)
IR 26,7% (7,8%) 29,1% (11,0%) 25,6% (12,4%) 19,8% (13,5%) 20,6% (12,0%)
FR 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 25,6% (0,0%) 20,3% (0,0%)
ToR 9,5% (2,3%) 12,0% (2,4%) 13,5% (3,5%) 11,3% (2,8%) 11,1% (2,0%)
IR 26,7% (7,8%) 29,1% (11,0%) 25,6% (12,4%) 19,7% (13,4%) 20,6% (12,0%)
FR 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 25,6% (0,0%) 20,3% (0,0%)
ToR 9,4% (2,4%) 11,7% (2,2%) 13,3% (3,5%) 11,3% (2,8%) 11,1% (2,0%)
IR 26,7% (7,8%) 29,2% (11,1%) 25,6% (12,4%) 19,7% (13,4%) 20,6% (12,0%)
FR 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 25,6% (0,0%) 19,5% (0,0%)
ToR 9,3% (2,3%) 11,5% (2,0%) 13,2% (3,5%) 11,3% (2,8%) 11,1% (1,9%)
IR 26,6% (7,8%) 29,2% (11,1%) 25,5% (12,4%) 19,7% (13,4%) 20,7% (11,8%)
FR 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 25,6% (0,0%) 19,5% (0,0%)
ToR 9,2% (2,3%) 11,3% (1,9%) 13,1% (3,6%) 11,2% (2,7%) 11,1% (1,9%)
IR 26,6% (7,7%) 29,3% (11,2%) 25,5% (12,4%) 19,8% (13,4%) 20,7% (11,8%)
FR 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 0,0% (0,0%) 25,6% (0,0%) 19,5% (0,0%)
ToR 9,1% (2,2%) 11,1% (1,9%) 12,9% (3,3%) 11,2% (2,7%) 11,1% (1,9%)
IR 26,6% (7,7%) 29,3% (11,2%) 0,255 (12,4%) 0,198 (13,5%) 0,207 (11,8%)
0.5%
1%
1.5%
2%
2.5%
10% 30% 50% 70% 90%
0%
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B. Bootstrapped Simulation Results 
Figure 34: Performance comparison of the bootstrapped DIHTS vs. the benchmark portfolio. 
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Figure 35: Efficient frontier estimation for the bootstrapped DIHTS vs. the benchmark portfolio. 
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Figure 36: Estimation of the mean Alpha values of the bootstrapped DIHTS and its 90% C.I. 
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Figure 37: Mean allocation of the Bootstrapped DIHTS  
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Table 11: Horizon sensitivity of the bootstrapped DIHTS vs. the benchmark portfolio. 
CW 
 
MV 
 
IR 
 
Horizon 
(Years) 
Fail Rate  IR  ToR  PLGF 
DIHTS  PTF  DIHTS  PTF  DIHTS  PTF    
5  7,92%  12,58%  59,01%  70,32%  6,57%  3,80%  ‐5,47% 
(30,2%)  (33,59%)  (3,5%)  (0,91%)  (13,27%) 
6  8,33%  11,10%  46,28%  46,80%  7,40%  4,95%  ‐2,90% 
(22,6%)  (22,92%)  (3,4%)  (1,23%)  (11,42%) 
7  7,78%  9,39%  39,24%  38,24%  8,76%  6,31%  ‐1,49% 
(10,6%)  (10,16%)  (3,7%)  (1,73%)  (10,13%) 
8  7,42%  4,99%  20,53%  20,57%  9,90%  7,91%  0,85% 
(3,2%)  (3,09%)  (4,0%)  (2,28%)  (9,56%) 
9  10,31%  7,43%  12,85%  12,91%  11,09%  9,45%  ‐1,18% 
(1,0%)  (0,81%)  (4,7%)  (3,11%)  (11,20%) 
10  10,42%  6,29%  8,94%  9,44%  12,51%  11,26%  0,52% 
(0,7%)  (0,66%)  (5,4%)  (3,75%)  (10,42%) 
 
Horizon 
(Years) 
Fail Rate  IR  ToR  PLGF 
DIHTS  PTF  DIHTS  PTF  DIHTS  PTF 
5  10,10%  16,58%  122,92%  107,33%  7,60%  5,71%  ‐6,54% 
(80,4%)  (73,70%)  (4,2%)  (1,82%)  (13,00%) 
6  10,23%  14,58%  30,46%  32,15%  8,53%  7,14%  ‐4,75% 
(8,6%)  (9,03%)  (4,2%)  (2,59%)  (11,31%) 
7  9,81%  13,55%  31,91%  31,01%  10,05%  8,69%  ‐3,87% 
(13,2%)  (12,77%)  (4,7%)  (3,36%)  (8,96%) 
8  10,44%  9,03%  24,90%  24,30%  11,86%  11,01%  ‐0,30% 
(1,8%)  (2,90%)  (5,8%)  (4,39%)  (9,52%) 
9  13,63%  10,76%  ‐22,30%  ‐19,70%  12,85%  12,97%  ‐1,47% 
(31,5%)  (27,87%)  (6,5%)  (5,69%)  (11,59%) 
10  13,45%  10,25%  15,60%  11,31%  14,04%  14,39%  ‐0,26% 
(5,2%)  (4,49%)  (7,3%)  (5,97%)  (9,95%) 
 
Horizon 
(Years) 
Fail Rate  IR  ToR  PLGF 
DIHTS  PTF  DIHTS  PTF  DIHTS  PTF 
5  9,93%  16,17%  56,05%  51,79%  8,10%  6,17%  ‐7,03% 
(21,4%)  (19,95%)  (4,9%)  (2,38%)  (13,31%) 
6  10,55%  14,19%  45,52%  47,95%  9,13%  7,79%  ‐5,82% 
(18,8%)  (21,36%)  (4,9%)  (3,02%)  (12,81%) 
7  8,83%  12,24%  25,64%  31,05%  10,66%  9,37%  ‐5,92% 
(15,2%)  (21,26%)  (5,3%)  (3,77%)  (14,60%) 
8  9,63%  8,70%  29,69%  32,00%  11,68%  11,27%  ‐1,01% 
(9,0%)  (9,78%)  (6,1%)  (4,69%)  (12,55%) 
9  13,33%  10,55%  22,52%  21,03%  13,26%  13,63%  ‐4,56% 
(6,2%)  (4,92%)  (6,6%)  (5,61%)  (12,93%) 
10  12,14%  8,60%  4,94%  4,89%  15,44%  16,14%  ‐2,09% 
(7,0%)  (6,91%)  (8,2%)  (7,61%)  (13,75%) 
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Table 12: Horizon sensitivity analysis of the allocation for the bootstrapped DIHTS. 
CW 
 
MV 
 
IR 
 
Horizon \ 
Allocation ZCN SPX REIT GSCI 
5  16,8% 26,9% 26,9% 26,9%
(10,9%) (1,8%) (1,4%) (2,7%) 
6  16,2% 27,1% 27,1% 27,1%
(10,3%) (2,4%) (0,6%) (1,9%) 
7  15,0% 27,7% 27,7% 27,7%
(8,6%) (1,7%) (1,1%) (2,4%) 
8  14,5% 27,7% 27,7% 27,7%
(7,3%) (1,8%) (0,7%) (1,9%) 
9  14,3% 27,5% 27,5% 27,5%
(5,9%) (1,2%) (1,0%) (2,1%) 
10  14,5% 27,4% 27,4% 27,4%
(5,1%) (1,0%) (0,7%) (1,6%) 
 
Horizon \ 
Allocation ZCN SPX REIT GSCI 
5  17,9% 35,6% 16,9% 26,9%
(10,8%) (6,9%) (7,3%) (7,8%) 
6  17,6% 36,1% 16,5% 27,0%
(10,1%) (7,3%) (7,4%) (7,8%) 
7  16,6% 36,9% 16,7% 27,5%
(8,7%) (7,3%) (7,5%) (7,9%) 
8  16,1% 35,2% 16,8% 29,4%
(7,4%) (6,6%) (6,8%) (7,2%) 
9  16,3% 35,8% 16,3% 28,4%
(5,6%) (6,7%) (7,1%) (7,4%) 
10  16,9% 35,8% 15,8% 27,8%
(5,1%) (7,2%) (7,4%) (7,7%) 
 
Horizon \ 
Allocation ZCN SPX REIT GSCI 
5  17,3% 22,5% 35,5% 21,6%
(10,7%) (5,7%) (6,1%) (6,6%) 
6  17,1% 22,9% 35,7% 21,4%
(10,2%) (5,9%) (5,9%) (6,4%) 
7  15,9% 21,9% 37,0% 22,7%
(8,7%) (6,3%) (6,5%) (6,9%) 
8  15,8% 25,3% 35,9% 20,1%
(7,5%) (5,7%) (5,8%) (6,1%) 
9  14,9% 24,8% 35,9% 20,4%
(5,8%) (5,5%) (5,7%) (6,1%) 
10  14,5% 23,2% 36,3% 21,3%
(5,0%) (5,5%) (5,7%) (5,9%) 
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Figure 40: SR pricing of the swap rate over a 10-year horizon 
 
 
 
B. Black-Scholes pricing of the security for other maturities 
 
Figure 41: BS pricing of the swap rate over a 1-year horizon 
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Figure 42: BS pricing of the swap rate over a 2-year horizon 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43: BS pricing of the swap rate over a 10-year horizon 
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Résumé :  
La disparitions graduelle des peurs liées à l’inflation pendant l’ère de la «Grande 
Modération» macroéconomique est aujourd’hui chose révolue : la crise financière américaine 
des «Subprimes», la «Grande Récession» ainsi que la crise des dettes souveraines qui s’en est 
suivie ont abouti à un nouvel ordre économique caractérisé par une volatilité accrue de 
l’inflation, un accroissement des chocs dans les prix des matières premières et une défiance 
envers la qualité de la signature de certains émetteurs souverains pour n’en mentionner que 
trois caractéristiques. De la réduction des émissions de titres souverains indexés sur 
l’inflation aux taux réels négatifs jusqu’à de très longues maturités, cette nouvelle donne tend 
à mettre en péril aussi bien les stratégies conventionnelles de couvertures inflation que les 
stratégies directionnelles purement nominales . Cette thèse a pour but d’investiguer les effets 
de ces évènements qui ont changé la donne macro-financière et d’évaluer leurs conséquences 
en terme de couverture inflation aussi bien dans la gestion actif-passif des investisseurs 
institutionnels que sur l’épargne des particuliers. Trois stratégies alternatives de couverture 
sont proposés pour y faire face. 
Descripteurs : Couverture Inflation, Allocation de Portefeuille, Investissements Alternatifs, 
Matières Premières, Taux Réels, Inflation Sous-Jacente, Global Macro, « Passage de 
l’inflation », Allocation Stratégique, Assurance de Portefeuilles, Grande Récession. 
Abstract :  
Gone are the days when inflation fears had receded under years of “Great Moderation” in 
macroeconomics. The US subprime financial crisis, the ensuing “Great Recession” and the 
sovereign debt scares that spread throughout much of the industrialized world brought about 
a new order characterized by higher inflation volatility, severe commodity price shocks and 
uncertainty over sovereign bond creditworthiness to name just a few. All of which tend to put 
in jeopardy both conventional inflation protected strategies and nominal unhedged ones: from 
reduced issues of linkers to negative long-term real rates, they call into question the viability 
of current strategies. This paper investigates those game changing events and their asset 
liability management consequences for retail and institutional investors. Three alternative 
ways to achieve real value protection are proposed. 
Keywords : Inflation Hedging, Portfolio Allocation, Alternative Investment, Commodities, Real 
Rates, Core Inflation, Global Macro, Inflation Pass-through, Strategic Allocation, Portfolio 
Insurance, Great Recession. 
 
 
